Negro Blood in His Veins: The Development and Disappearance of the Doctrine of Defamation Per Se by Racial Misidentification in the American South by Brenner, Samuel
Santa Clara Law Review
Volume 50 | Number 2 Article 3
1-1-2010
Negro Blood in His Veins: The Development and
Disappearance of the Doctrine of Defamation Per
Se by Racial Misidentification in the American
South
Samuel Brenner
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Santa
Clara Law Review by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Recommended Citation
Samuel Brenner, Negro Blood in His Veins: The Development and Disappearance of the Doctrine of Defamation Per Se by Racial
Misidentification in the American South, 50 Santa Clara L. Rev. 333 (2010).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/vol50/iss2/3
"NEGRO BLOOD IN HIS VEINS":* THE
DEVELOPMENT AND DISAPPEARANCE OF THE
DOCTRINE OF DEFAMATION PER SE BY
RACIAL MISIDENTIFICATION IN THE
AMERICAN SOUTH
Samuel Brenner**
After losing a 2003 election for New York City Council for
the 49th District (Staten Island),1  Independent Party
candidate Dr. John Johnson brought suit against the Staten
Island Advance, alleging, among other complaints, that the
newspaper had defamed him by publishing a picture of a
different "Reverend John Johnson" above his name, and so
presumably had lowered him in the eyes of his community.2
The picture the newspaper published was that of a white
man; Dr. Johnson, the candidate, is black.3 Writing the
opinion on the case, Judge Philip S. Straniere seemed
incredulous. "Is plaintiff asserting that labeling a black man
a white man is 'defamation'?" Straniere asked rhetorically.4
"In a year when this country celebrated the 50th anniversary
of Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, plaintiff would
*Deese v. Collins, 133 S.E. 92 (N.C. 1926); see also infra note 231.
**J.D., The University of Michigan Law School, 2009; Ph.D. (History), Brown
University, 2009. Law clerk, Hon. David W. McKeague, United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (2009-2010); Law clerk, Hon. Kim McLane
Wardlaw, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (2010-2011). I
would especially like to thank Don Herzog for his advice and direction. I would
also like to thank Andrew Arno, Claudia Arno, Charles Brenner, Elaine
Brenner, Ellen Katz, Douglas Laycock, Richard Primus, Rebecca Scott, Benedict
Schweigert, Dan Sharfstein, Gil Seinfeld, and J.J. Prescott and the Student
Scholarship workshop at The University of Michigan Law School.
1. In the vote, the Democratic candidate received 11,132 of 17,949 votes,
while the Republican candidate received 4,607 votes. Johnson came in a distant
third, with 390 votes. Johnson v. Staten Island Advance Newspaper Inc., No.
38480/03, 2004 WL 4986754, at *2 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. July 23, 2004).
2. See id.
3. Id. at *3.
4. Id. at *6.
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seek the Court to adopt a standard of libel that was prevalent
in the Southern part of the United States before the civil
rights movement of the last half century."5
In 1989, over a decade before Johnson lost his election on
Staten Island, a woman in Georgia elicited a similarly
indignant response from a state appellate court in Thomason
v. Times-Journal when she sued a newspaper for mistakenly
publishing an obituary of her and falsely stating that her
funeral arrangements were being handled by a funeral home
known to cater to blacks.' In Georgia, the publication of a
false obituary is not libelous per se absent special
circumstances.7 Thomason was arguing that the newspaper
had created special circumstances leading to her being
"ridiculed and held in contempt" because the funeral home
"serves primarily black people whose customs at death are
different than whites."' Labeling this argument "indecorous,"
the court pointed out that Thomason had not demonstrated
any racial distinctions in funerary customs and noted
acerbically that it would "not speculate regarding [her]
evidentiary deficiency. " '
While seemingly unconnected, Johnson and Thomason 1°
both stand as attempts to resurrect what was once a
standard-and morally egregious-tort in American
jurisprudence: defamation per se by racial misidentification
(DPSRM).1' Between the first years after the ratification of
5. Id.
6. See Thomason v. Times-Journal, Inc., 379 S.E.2d 551, 553 (Ga. Ct. App.
1989).
7. E.g., id. (citing O'Neil v. Edmonds, 157 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. Va. 1958)).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 553-54.
10. Thomason might arguably be said to stand as an attempt to resurrect
the related tort of tortious injury by racial misidentification. These sorts of
cases (defamation by racial misidentification and tortious injury by racial
misidentification) overlapped, see, e.g., Lee v. New Orleans Great N. R.R. Co., 51
So. 182 (La. 1910); Ex parte Plessy, 45 La. Ann. 80 (1893), but differed in that
the defamation cases implicated only utterances and written publications. See
infra note 205.
11. See generally J.H. Crabb, Annotation, Libel and Slander: Statements
Respecting Race, Color, or Nationality as Actionable, 46 A.L.R.2d 1287 (1956);
John C. Watson, Defamation by Racial Misidentification: A Study of the Social
Tort, 4 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 77 (2002) (describing cases and analyzing the
sociological motives behind the continued existence of the tort in common law).
For an additional modern case involving an attempt to resurrect the theory of
tortious defamation by racial misidentification, see Polygram Records, Inc. v.
Superior Court, 216 Cal. Rptr. 252 (Ct. App. 1985). In Polygram, the court dealt
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the United States Constitution 12 and the middle of the
twentieth century, 13 state courts in the American South and
West (and in at least one state in the North 4 ) repeatedly
found defendants in tort actions liable for having uttered per
se defamatory (either slanderous or libelous) statements by
falsely or mistakenly identifying individuals as "Mulattos,"
15
"Colored," 16 "Negros," 7 or "Niggers."1I The trend, which had
seemingly arisen out of nowhere in violation of Anglo-
American common law traditions, picked up speed in the first
years of the twentieth century,' 9 with state courts deciding
cases of defamation by racial misidentification (DRM)
with a claim from a white winemaker that his business had been harmed when
comedian Robin Williams made a joke unknowingly linking the winemaker's
name with African Americans. Williams, the plaintiff argued, had associated
"Rege" brand wines "with Blacks, allegedly 'a socio-economic group of persons
commonly considered to be the antithesis of wine connoisseurs,' who 'harbor
obviously unsophisticated tastes in wines.'" Id. at 261, discussed in Lyrissa
Barnett Lidsky, Defamation, Reputation, and the Myth of Community, 71 WASH.
L. REV. 1, 32 (1996).
12. See, e.g., Eden v. Legare, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 171 (Ct. Com. P1. & Gen. Sess.
1791).
13. See, e.g., Bowen v. Indep. Publ'g Co., 96 S.E.2d 564 (S.C. 1957).
14. In 1914, a New York judge rejected a theory of slander per se by racial
misidentification, but explicitly stated that the court would have recognized the
doctrine of libel per se by racial misidentification. See MacIntyre v. Fruchter,
148 N.Y.S. 786 (Sup. Ct. 1914). In 1935, a media corporation asked a New York
court to reconsider a lower court's refusal to dismiss a complaint from William
R. Monks, a white man who alleged that the newspaper described him as a
"negro" and falsely quoted him. Monks v. Orange County Indep. Co., 277 N.Y.S.
992, 992 (App. Div. 1935). The court upheld the lower court's order denying
dismissal, agreeing that the complaint stated facts sufficient to support a cause
of action; the court issued no opinion, and might have been acting on either the
racial misidentification claim or the claim that the newspaper intentionally
misquoted Monks. Id.
15. See, e.g., Atkinson v. Hartley, 12 S.C.L. (1 McCord) 203, 204 (Const. Ct.
App. 1821); King v. Wood, 10 S.C.L. (1 Nott & McC.) 184 (Const. Ct. App. 1818);
Eden, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 171. In this article, capitalizations of racial descriptions
generally follow the style used in individual cases. Otherwise, racial
descriptions, when capitalized, signal a legal description of an individual's race,
and when not capitalized, suggest instead a physical description.
16. See, e.g., Flood v. News & Courier Co., 50 S.E. 637 (S.C. 1905).
17. See, e.g., Upton v. Times-Democrat Publ'g Co., 28 So. 970 (La. 1900);
Spotorno v. Fourichon, 4 So. 71, 71 (La. 1888); Spencer v. Looney, 82 S.E. 745
(Va. 1914).
18. See, e.g., Wright v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 281 Ill. App. 495 (App. Ct.
1935); Mopsikov v. Cook, 95 S.E. 426 (Va. 1918).
19. See, e.g., Jones v. R.L. Polk & Co., 67 So. 577 (Ala. 1915); Upton, 28 So.
at 970, 972; Collins v. Okla. State Hosp., 184 P. 946 (Okla. 1916); Flood, 50 S.E.
at 637; Spencer, 82 S.E. at 745.
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through the mid-to-late 1950s.2 °  Then, after the South
Carolina Supreme Court's 1957 decision in Bowen v.
Independent Publishing Co. ,21 such cases seem simply to have
vanished from the state and federal reporters-with the
exception of a very few modern fringe examples, such as
Thomason and Johnson. Although neither the United States
Supreme Court nor any state supreme courts actually
reversed these precedents or repudiated these decisions, after
the 1950s such suits apparently no longer reached the upper
levels of the court system.22 While defamation per se cases
persist in the modern era, and while numerous scholars have
weighed in, in recent years, on the propriety or importance of
sexual orientation defamation per se decisions, scholars have
generally not examined how and why racial defamation
decisions, or even cases, disappeared from the American
judicial record.23  Those scholars who have examined the
subject of DRM have been left to make ultimately
unsatisfying arguments. 24  The reason for the disappearance
20. See, e.g., Natchez Times Publ'g Co. v. Dunigan, 72 So. 2d 681 (Miss.
1954); Bowen v. Indep. Publ'g Co., 96 S.E.2d 564 (S.C. 1957). In an amicus brief
in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, the American Jewish Committee
explicitly invoked this history, citing cases from Louisiana, Oklahoma, South
Carolina, Georgia, Illinois, and Texas. Brief of American Jewish Congress as
Amicus Curiae at 12 n.*, Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
(No. 1).
21. Bowen, 96 S.E.2d 564.
22. Cases in which plaintiffs alleged slander per se over the use of
disparaging racial terms when plaintiffs agree that their races have been
correctly identified have continued to reach the courts. See, e.g., Bradshaw v.
Swagerty, 563 P.2d 511 (Kan. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that a complaint alleging
that the Black plaintiff had been called a "nigger," "bastard," and "knot-headed
boy" failed to allege actionable slander per se). "The term 'nigger' is one of
insult, abuse and belittlement harking back to slavery days. Its use is resented,
and rightly so. It nevertheless is not within any category recognized as
slanderous per se." Id. at 514. See also Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A
Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 133 (1982).
23. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004) (discussing
the history of racial equality in the courts without including any reference to
cases of defamation by racial misidentification); Royal Dumas, Commentary,
The Muddled Mettle of Jurisprudence: Race and Procedure in Alabama's
Appellate Courts, 1901-1930, 58 ALA. L. REV. 417 (2006) (failing to discuss
tortious racial misidentification in the Alabama courts and ignoring Jones, 67
So. at 577, a case in which the court upheld the judgment for the defendants,
holding that in order to constitute defamation, racial misidentification must
include an element of malice).
24. See, e.g., Watson, supra note 11, at 104 ("Defamation cases based on
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of such cases thus remains a historical mystery-a mystery
that perhaps cannot be solved without a full understanding of
the strange and tortured career of the doctrine of DPSRM
between the late eighteenth and mid-twentieth centuries.
This article argues that, after at least one false start in
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the
doctrine of tortious defamation per se by racial
misidentification: (1) entered the common law through the
mistaken or misapplied decisions of a single state supreme
court; (2) was continually confused and in turn misapplied by
courts throughout its lifespan; and (3) even in its heyday (the
first half of the twentieth century) was never as monolithic or
cohesive as it might today appear. This article then examines
why adjudicated allegations of racial defamation or libel per
se largely vanished after the mid-to-late 1950s after another
decision by that same supreme court, and argues that the
doctrine may have disappeared in the American South and
West not because of any specific judicial precedent, but rather
because (apart from the changing nature of Equal Protection
doctrine) three judicial and societal developments intersected
to shrink enormously the potential universe of DPSRM cases,
and so to essentially cut off the judicial food supply of the
doctrine. These developments comprised (1) the judicial move
away from the slander per se element of the doctrine, often in
favor of the libel per se element of the doctrine and with an
added malice component; (2) the societal and statutory move
away from official acceptance or endorsement of racism; and
(3) the Supreme Court's move in cases such as New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan25 and Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts2 6
toward applying First Amendment doctrine to limit tort
liability for defamation in cases involving public figures or
matters of public concern. Part I discusses the evolution of
racial identification have become virtually nonexistent because courts have
come to realize that countenancing such claims presumes racial inferiority and
court action on the issue is tantamount to government sanctioning of
discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment."). While Watson is
likely correct about what courts think about this tort today, in support of his
point he cites to only two Supreme Court cases: one decided in 1948 and one
decided in 1984. Given that the tort demonstrably existed into the 1950s, long
after the Court's ruling in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), but
disappeared long before the Court's ruling in Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429
(1984), Watson's argument lacks explanatory value.
25. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
26. Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
2010]
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the general doctrine of defamation per se and examines the
existing scholarly work on the subject of tortious racial
misidentification, both defamatory and otherwise. Part II
examines the rise, historical development, and eventual
disappearance of the tort of DPSRM in various states and
jurisdictions between the late eighteenth century and mid-
twentieth century, and suggests that the modern doctrine
arose only after the South Carolina Supreme Court, in a
questionable legal move, applied Louisiana precedent to
obviate the need for plaintiffs alleging racial misidentification
to prove special damages. Part III argues that this
disappearance can, in large part, be explained by the
intersection of three legal and societal circumstances that had
the effect of shrinking the universe of potential DPSRM
claims, and so starved the doctrine at its source by ensuring
that DPSRM cases could no longer make it into the courts.
PART I: DEFAMATION PER SE AND TORTIOUS RACIAL
MISIDENTIFICATION SCHOLARSHIP
A. Defamation Per Se Defined
The tort of defamation, whether libel or slander, and the
concomitant doctrine of defamation per se, developed in
critical ways in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
It has served an important function during the twentieth
century for those who believe that they have been injured by
being falsely labeled as holding a particular creed, belonging
to a particular organization, or having a specific sexual
orientation.27
27. During the Red Scare, for instance, those alleged to be Communists
used the doctrine to try to rescue their reputations from the blacklist. E.g.,
Michael J. Tommaney, Community Standards of Defamation, 34 ALB. L. REV.
634, 63940 (1970). See generally Cases Noted, Accusation of Communist Party
Membership as Defamatory Per Se, 50 COLUM. L. REV. 526, 526-29 (1950). In
more recent years, and with varying results, several individuals sued on the
theory that falsely being labeled "homosexual" constitutes defamation per se.
See, e.g., Albright v. Morton, 321 F. Supp. 2d 130 (D. Mass. 2004), affd Amtrak
Prod., Inc. v. Morton, 410 F.3d 69 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding that while false
allegation of homosexuality would, after the Massachusetts legalization of
same-sex marriage, no longer constitute defamation per se, Madonna's former
bodyguard was not able to state sufficient evidence to support a claim); Murphy
v. Pizarrio, No. 94 Civ. 0471 (JFK), 1995 WL 565990, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22,
1995) (holding that a published statement imputing homosexuality to another is
defamatory per se under New York law); see also Daniel Wise, NY Judge: Being
[Vol:50
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At common law, written, spoken, or gestural
communications either may or must constitute one of the
elements of the four torts William L. Prosser, one of the deans
of American tort law, identified as making up the law of
privacy.28 Writing in 1960, Prosser suggested that these four
torts included:
(1) intrusion upon the plaintiffs seclusion or solitude, or
into his private affairs; (2) public disclosure of
embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff; (3) publicity
which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye;
and (4) appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of
the plaintiffs name or likeness.29
In various ways, Prosser added, these torts intersect with the
tort of defamation 3°-which he defined as "an invasion of the
interest in reputation and good name."31  Traditionally,
defamation consists of the publication of a false statement
about an individual, which statement lowers that individual
in the eyes of the community and deters others from dealing
with the individual.32 Defamation encompasses both slander,
which is the spoken or gestural publication of false
statements, and libel, which is the written or permanent
publication of such statements.33 While some jurisdictions
see no distinction between libel and slander, the general rule
is that the scope of libel is broader than the scope of slander,
such that "all slanderous statements would be libelous if
written, [but] not all libelous statements would be slanderous
if spoken."34  Generally, in order to recover, a plaintiff
alleging defamation must demonstrate that he or she has
suffered some form of damages.3 Some sorts of publications,
Labeled Gay May No Longer Be Defamation, N.Y. LAW., June 3, 2004,
http://exodus.blogs.com/liveoutloud/2004/06/nyjudge-being_.html.
28. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
29. Id.
30. Id. passim.
31. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 111, at 737
(4th ed. 1971).
32. See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 448 (8th ed. 2004) (defining
"defamation"); 53 C.J.S. Libel and Slander § 10 (2005); 50 AM. JUR. 2D Libel and
Slander § 21 (2006); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 558, 569-574
(1977).
33. See, e.g., 53 C.J.S. Libel and Slander § 5 (2005).
34. Id.
35. The question of whether plaintiffs alleging libel must plead and prove
special damages became a critical point of contention among the scholars of the
20101 339
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however, whether allegedly slanderous or libelous, are
actionable per se, in which case "all that need be proved is the
utterance of the words, and because of their character the law
will presume damages and dispense with the showing of
actual special damages as a necessity for recovery. "36
Traditionally, common law courts recognized four categories
of words that were actionable in themselves, or that
constituted defamation per se: imputations of criminal
misconduct, sexual misconduct, loathsome disease, or
imputations affecting business, trades, or one's office. 37
Despite the seeming clarity of the common law tort of
defamation, in fact defamation doctrine was for much of the
eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries confused and
illogical. "It must be confessed at the beginning," Prosser and
Robert E. Keaton wrote in 1984, "that there is a great deal of
the law of defamation which makes no sense. It contains
anomalies and absurdities for which no legal writer has ever
had a kind word .... 3 One area of confusion was in the
precise distinction between slander and libel. As Comment
"b" to Section 568 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, of
which Prosser was the Reporter, notes:
It is impossible to define and difficult to describe with
precision the two forms of defamation, slander and libel.
Oral defamation is tortuous if the words spoken fall within
a limited class of cases in which the words are actionable
per se, or if they cause special damages. Written
defamation is actionable per se. For two centuries and a
half the common law has treated the tort of defamation in
two different ways on the basis of mere form. Yet no
respectable authority has ever attempted to justify the
distinction on principle ....
As a common law tort, defamation varied widely between
states, with different jurisdictions applying different
definitions of "slander per se" and "libel per se." By 1939,
American Law Institute as they attempted to draft the Restatement (Second) of
Torts. See, e.g., George C. Christie, Defamatory Opinions and the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1621, 1621-22 (1977).
36. Crabb, supra note 11, at 1287.
37. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 569-574 (1977); 50 AM.
JUR. 2D Libel and Slander § 178 (2006).
38. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 771-72 (W. Page Keeton,
Dan B. Dobbs, Robert E. Keeton & David G. Owen, eds., 5th ed. 1984).
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568 cmt. b (1977).
340 [Vol:50
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however, at least some state courts (including, for example,
the Mississippi courts) were depending on the Restatement
(First) of Torts for a coherent definition of defamation per se
(or defamation that was "actionable per se")4 ° as "any written
or printed language which tends to injure one's reputation,
and thereby expose him to public hatred, contempt or
ridicule, degrade him in society, lessen him in public esteem
or lower him in the confidence of the community."
41
B. Scholarly Analysis of Tortious Racial Misidentification
Relatively few scholars have written about tortious per se
defamatory racial misidentification,42 and of those few, most
wrote prior to the 1950s.43 Generally, modern scholars and
commentators have barely touched on the subject, or have
mentioned it in passing, while discussing issues of either race
40. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 569 (1938) ("One who falsely, and
without a privilege to do so, publishes matter defamatory to another in such a
manner as to make the publication a libel is liable to the other although no
special harm or loss of reputation results therefrom.").
41. Conroy v. Breland, 189 So. 814, 815 (Miss. 1939) (citing Hodges v.
Cunningham, 135 So. 215 (Miss. 1931); Wrought Iron Range Co. v. Boltz, 86 So.
354 (Miss. 1920)); see also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 569 (1938). In the
context of tortious racial misidentification, the Mississippi court in the key case
Natchez Times Publishing Co. v. Dunigan, 72 So. 2d 681, 684 (Miss. 1954),
appeared to conflate libel and slander, identifying the more expansive definition
offered in Conroy simply as the definition of "libel per se."
42. See, e.g., CHARLES S. MANGUM, JR., THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE NEGRO
(Johnson Reprint Corp., 1970) (1940); GILBERT THOMAS STEPHENSON, RACE
DISTINCTIONS IN AMERICAN LAW 26-34 (1910); Gilbert Thomas Stephenson,
Race Distinctions in American Law, 43 AM. L. REV. 29 (1909). Most pre-1950
references came in quick citations in early treatises. See, e.g., FRANCIS H.
BOHLEN, CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 830 n.1 (1915) (mentioning that in the
Southern states, it is libelous to misidentify an individual as Negro, and citing
cases); THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 215 nn.31-32
(John Lewis ed., 1907) (including four DPSRM cases in a long chapter
examining libel liability); MARTIN L. NEWELL, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION, LIBEL
AND SLANDER IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES 86 n.14 (1890) (identifying two
DPSRM cases in a short paragraph); THOMAS STARKIE, A TREATISE ON THE LAw
OF SLANDER, LIBEL, SCANDALUM MAGNATUM, AND FALSE RUMOuRS 21 n.1
(1826) (referring to early DPSRM cases in a footnote); JOHN TOWNSHEND, A
TREATISE ON THE WRONGS CALLED SLANDER AND LIBEL 157 n.1 (4th ed. 1890)
(citing a Louisiana DPSRM case in discussing the difference between words
actionable in themselves and words not actionable in themselves).
43. But see Watson, supra note 11; see also J. Reese Daniel, Defamation-
Calling a White Person a Negro in Print, 7 S.C.L.Q. 472 (1954-1955); W. Swan
Yerger, Recent Decisions, Libel-Publishing That A White Woman is a Negro is
Libelous Per Se, 26 MISS. L.J. 195 (1954-1955).
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or current defamation law more broadly."
Gilbert Thomas Stephenson, the first author to address
the issue of DPSRM at any length in a major treatise,4 5
identified and discussed a number of important cases
applying the doctrine, but ultimately offered unsatisfactory
explanations of how the doctrine had developed and was
being applied. Stephenson published in 1910, prior to the
spate of decisions rendered by Southern courts in the first few
decades of the twentieth century, but even in analyzing pre-
1910 cases he could not find, ignored, or glossed over a
number that would have helped him construct a more
complete model of how the doctrine of DRM had been shaped
over the previous century. 46 "From early times," Stephenson
wrote, "it has been held to be slander, actionable per se to say
of a white man that he is a Negro or akin to a Negro."47
While this was true in South Carolina, and perhaps
Louisiana depending upon how one interprets "early times",
Stephenson's attempt to explain away two of the
contravening decisions seems strained.48 In describing an
1818 Ohio decision 49 in which the court held that charging a
white man with being "akin" to a Negro was not slander per
se, for instance, Stephenson noted that "the only explanation,
apparently, of this conflict between the decisions of South
44. See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 222; Lidsky, supra note 111; Tommaney,
supra note 277, at 639. The larger question of causes of action arising from
racial misidentification, in contrast, has spawned a large and complex body of
scholarship. See, e.g., Daniel J. Sharfstein, The Secret History of Race in the
United States, 112 YALE L.J. 1473 (2003). After Plessy, many white plaintiffs
brought claims of tortious injury against rail and streetcar conductors who had
ushered those plaintiffs into Jim Crow cars or seats. Id. at 1500-01.
45. In his 1910 Race Distinctions in Modern Law, Stephenson included a
short chapter entitled "Defamation to Call a White Person a Negro." See
STEPHENSON, supra note 42, at 26-34.
46. See, e.g., Johnson v. Brown, 13 F. Cas. 734 (C.C.D.C. 1832) (No. 7375);
Boullemet v. Philips, 2 Rob. 365 (La. 1842) (reversing a finding for a plaintiff in
a DPSRM case on the grounds that the evidence at trial was insufficient to show
malice); Dobard v. Nunez, 6 La. Ann. 294 (1851); Scott v. Peebles, 10 Miss. (2 S.
& M.) 546 (1844); Kenworthy v. Brown, 92 N.Y.S. 34 (App. Div. 1904).
47. STEPHENSON, supra note 42, at 26-27.
48. Stephenson also failed to identify or discuss the third pre-Civil War
contravening case. See Johnson, F. Cas. 734.
49. See Barrett v. Jarvis, 1 Tapp. 244 (5th Cir. Ohio 1818). A note on
sources: Barrett is not included in the Ohio reporters because Ohio did not
officially begin reporting its cases until 1824. Benjamin Tappan, Chief Judge of
the Ohio 5th Circuit, gathered a number of the cases he had decided between
1816 and 1819 and published them as Tappan's Reports in 1831.
[Vol:50
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Carolina and Ohio is that in the latter State it was not
considered as much an insult to impute Negro blood to a
white man as in the former."5 In other words, Stephenson's
explanation for the different outcomes rested solely upon
what he believed were different perceptions of race in South
Carolina and Ohio in 1818. Whether or not perceptions in
South Carolina and Ohio varied all that much in 1818 (and,
given the historical record concerning the development of
racism in the North and West during the nineteenth century,
it seems unlikely), Stephenson's reasoning regarding these
1818 cases suggests that he subscribed to the "community
standards" theory of DRM-which was developed after the
Civil War. 1 In describing an 1860 North Carolina case in
which the court held that calling a white man a "free Negro"
was not actionable per se, Stephenson did not even attempt to
offer an explanation of the court's reasoning, and simply
labeled the decision "surprising."52
In attempting to describe the current state of the doctrine
in 1910, Stephenson called upon both the "community
standards" model of DRM and the traditional common-law
understanding that statements might constitute defamation
if the statements harm individuals in business. "The courts
have placed this [the doctrine that it is actionable per se to
say of a white man that he is a Negro or akin to a Negro]
under the second class-that is, words disparaging to a
person in his trade, business, or profession," Stephenson
argued.53 "It will have been noticed that all the courts which
have held it actionable per se to call a white person a Negro
have been in Southern States," he added, suggesting that
states in other regions would be less likely to adopt the
doctrine. 54  "The attitude of the court," he concluded,
"depends upon whether it is the consensus of opinion among
the people of the community that it is injurious to a white
man in his business and social relations to be called a
Negro."55
Stephenson's explanation of the development of tortious
50. STEPHENSON, supra note 42, at 27.
51. See, e.g., Spotorno v. Fourichon, 4 So. 71, 71 (La. 1888); infra Part II.B.
52. STEPHENSON, supra note 42, at 27.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 32.
55. Id.
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DRM fails in two ways: first, Stephenson seizes upon an
explanation, business relations, that simply was not the
governing logic behind many of the cases; 6 and second,
Stephenson, perhaps because he was a product of his time
and his Southern heritage, ignored the prevalence of racism
and lack of objectivity in the judiciary and throughout the
United States. Stephenson apparently believed that it was
possible for courts to weigh objectively the question of
whether within a particular jurisdiction it would be "injurious
to a white man in his business and social relations to be
called a Negro."57 Under Stephenson's formulation, the
doctrine should (given the prevalent racism of the early
1900s) have been good everywhere. The fact that it was not 58
suggests that at least some courts viewed the situation
differently than did Stephenson himself. In the end,
Stephenson's arguments, while useful in identifying the views
of a legal scholar in 1910, are too simplistic to explain the
true development of this tort.
In 1940, writing with the benefit of being able to view
and analyze the many cases on DRM decided by courts in the
first few decades of the twentieth century, Charles S.
Mangum of the University of North Carolina School of Law
provided a more nuanced and far more convincing
explanation of how the doctrine had developed over the
previous two centuries.59 Mangum argued that whether
defamation of this kind is actionable "is complicated by
certain technical differences between libel and slander which
developed with the common law."6" In analyzing the early
56. See, e.g., Atkinson v. Hartley, 12 S.C.L. (1 McCord) 203, 204 (Const. Ct.
App. 1821); King v. Wood, 10 S.C.L. (1 Nott & McC.) 184 (Const. Ct. App. 1818);
Eden, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 171.
57. STEPHENSON, supra note 42, at 32.
58. See, e.g., infra Part II.E.
59. See MANGUM, supra note 42, at 18-25. Mangum identified most of the
pre-1940 cases discussed in this article, including the pre-1910 cases
Stephenson had overlooked or ignored. See id.
60. Id. at 18. Mangum, however, concluded his long paragraph on this
question by noting:
[Ilt may be difficult to convince the southern white man that there is
any logical distinction between libel and slander in this respect, as a
person can be hurt just as much, and possibly more, by malicious
gossip of this sort as he can by a malevolent statement contained in a
newspaper or other publication.
Id. at 20.
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South Carolina, Arkansas, and Mississippi holdings that
mistakenly calling a white man a "Negro" or "Mulatto"
constituted defamation, or defamation per se, for instance,
Mangum, citing Arkansas and Mississippi statutes which can
be interpreted as enlarging upon the common law rule, noted
correctly that "[s]ome of the states . . . have had special
reasons for doing so. "161 The Louisiana decisions, Mangum
also noted, can be explained by the fact that Louisiana
operates under civil, rather than common, law.62 As Georgia
followed Louisiana's lead, while Virginia incorrectly cited to
South Carolina's idiosyncratic statute-based reasoning,
Mangum concluded, "[all this would lead one to believe that
a holding that such language is slanderous per se is not in
accordance with the accepted principles of the common law."63
Identifying, as Stephenson did, with the community
standards model, Mangum remarked that "it may be stated
that southern courts take judicial cognizance of the attitude
of the white man toward the Negro."64 Southern courts, he
added, would therefore consider as defamatory "certain
statements which would not be actionable if this attitude did
not exist."65
Mangum's analysis, while legally nuanced and
sophisticated, is nonetheless neither complete nor entirely
sufficient. He devotes very little space to discussing an
extremely complicated topic and seems to be more interested
in explaining the state of the doctrine in 1940 than in
analyzing the unusual historical development of the
doctrine.6 6  Mangum is also possibly too caught up in the
spirit of 1930s North Carolina to sense the absurdity and
inequality inherent in the "community standards" model and
the possibility that judges were making decisions in these
cases not only on the basis of established doctrine and
precedent, but also on the basis of simple bigotry or
predilection. The way the doctrine of DRM emerged from
61. Id. at 19.
62. Id. at 19-20; see infra Part II.C.
63. MANGUM, supra note 42, at 20; see infra Part II.C.
64. MANGUM, supra note 42, at 25.
65. Id. at 25.
66. See id. passim.
67. See, e.g., id. at 18 ("There can be no doubt that the term 'Negro' or
'colored person,' when applied to a person who is wholly of Caucasian blood,
carries with it a certain degree of opprobrium."). At the same time, Mangum
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the idiosyncratic South Carolina and Louisiana courts into
the common law in the early twentieth century demonstrates
how important race was in solidifying the law in the
American South, and how the absence of justifiable legal
doctrine was ignored in the move towards tearing down the
social and legal status of Blacks. Like Stephenson, Mangum
of course also wrote at a time when the doctrine was strong,
and so had no opportunity to step back and view the
development (and disappearance decades later) of tortious
DRM as a whole.
The most extensive recent analysis of the tort of DRM is
that published by John C. Watson in 2002.6" Watson's work,
while contributing to a sociological understanding of the
DPSRM doctrine in the context of American and Southern
racism, does not complete or correct the historical record
referenced by Stephenson and Mangum. Watson is less
concerned with analyzing the historical development or
disappearance of the doctrine, and is most concerned with
examining "the social values that were imbedded in the
determinations of when and where it was libel or slander per
se, to incorrectly identify a white person as black."69  In
analyzing these cases, Watson calls upon the historical and
sociological work of Joel Williamson7 ° to try to explain the
effect these doctrines had on Southern society during the
period of the 1860s through the 1950s, and perhaps to explain
changes in judicial rhetoric from Southern judges during the
same period.71 While he is concerned with the "evolution and
regression of the law of racial misidentification, particularly
in the South,"7 2 Watson is more concerned with analyzing the
societal forces leading to and deriving from tort liability for
racial misidentification than he is with explaining how and
why the doctrine entered the common law and how it shifted
recognizes that this prejudice "is ingrained and cannot easily be conquered even
by those who believe that no real racial inferiority exists." Id. Mangum also
notes that while the prejudice is particularly strong in the South "as a result of
historic factors and anti-Negro social attitudes which are taken judicial notice of
by the southern courts," even in the North and West "the imputation of Negro
blood is deeply resented in most instances." Id.
68. Watson, supra note 11.
69. Id. at 78.
70. JOEL WILLIAMSON, THE CRUCIBLE OF RACE: BLACK-WHITE RELATIONS
IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH SINCE EMANCIPATION (1984).
71. Watson, supra note 11, at 90-94, 97-100.
72. Id. at 78.
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and developed throughout the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries. 7
PART II: THE RISE AND FALL OF TORTIOUS DEFAMATION PER
SE BY RACIAL MISIDENTIFICATION
Part II of this article traces the historical emergence,
development, rise, and eventual downfall of defamation per se
by racial misidentification. Analysis of the development of
the DPSRM doctrine suggests that the modern doctrine (that
which was in force between the late 1800s and mid-1900s)
was created almost by accident, in a state (Louisiana) that
did not adhere to common law distinctions between words
actionable "in themselves" and words not actionable in
themselves.74 While states other than Louisiana did not
accept Louisiana's unique decision that it was not bound by
"the technical distinctions of the common law as to words
actionable per se and not actionable per se, and allowing, for
the latter, only actual pecuniary damages specially proved,"75
other Southern states, led by South Carolina, did adopt the
derivative doctrine that racial misidentification constituted
defamation per se in any state or community in which such
social habits, customs, and prejudices made it obvious that
calling a white man "black," "negro," "colored," or "mulatto"
was insulting and injurious. 76 It was this doctrine, at least
concerning published (or permanent) rather than oral
material, that survived and governed cases in a number of
Southern states through the late 1950s.77
The history of the doctrine of defamation per se by racial
misidentification demonstrates the complex connections
between race, geography, society, and the law in the
American South and West. Section A traces the rise of the
"rights deprivation" theory of defamation (specifically
slander) per se by racial misidentification in South Carolina
between 1791 and 1821, and discusses the two identifiable
cases outside of South Carolina embracing something like a
73. Watson presents an ideological description of the cases, but offers no
explanatory force. See id.
74. See Spotorno v. Fourichon, 4 So. 71 (La. 1888).
75. Id. at 71.
76. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Dallas Cotton Exch., 153 S.W.2d 266, 268 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1941).
77. See infra Part III.A.
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similar rule. Section B discusses how three states and
jurisdictions rejected the DPSRM doctrine as not fitting into
any of the traditional common law categories of words
"actionable in themselves." Section C describes how
Louisiana, a state that, because it adhered to the Napoleonic
Civil Code, rejected the traditional common law distinction
between words actionable in themselves (defamatory per se)
and words not actionable in themselves (not defamatory per
se), developed the alternative "community standards" model
for use in DPSRM cases. Section D argues that South
Carolina inappropriately (or perhaps even mistakenly)
created the modern "community standards" common law
DPSRM doctrine by mistakenly or incorrectly using
Louisiana's Civil Code (rather than common law) decisions as
non-binding precedent. Section D also traces how, over the
decade between 1900 and 1910, Louisiana and South
Carolina together evolved and perhaps clarified the doctrine
of DPSRM as it could be used in the common law. Section E
focuses on how, in the years after 1910, other Southern states
embraced or rejected various elements of the Louisiana/South
Carolina doctrine, ultimately generally accepting a strong
doctrine of libel per se by racial misidentification (LPSRM),
but a weak doctrine of slander per se by racial
misidentification (SPSRM). Section F examines the two great
last gasps of the DPSRM doctrine, and suggests that in the
absence of judicial reversal, these decisions would have
remained good law in at least some Southern states for a
measurable time, even though both cases suggest that there
was at least some interest even in Southern states in limiting
or abolishing the doctrine.
A. The Rise and Application of the Statutory "Rights
Deprivation" Theory
Liability for tortious defamation by racial
misidentification7" seems to have its antecedents in the
78. It is important here to distinguish between later theories of defamation
per se, under which plaintiffs did not need to prove any special damages in
order to recover, and the South Carolina theory of slander per se by racial
misidentification, which seemed to be based on the notion that no special
damages needed to be proven because they were obvious given the South
Carolina Negro Act of 1740. See JOHN BELTON O'NEALL, THE NEGRO LAW OF
SOUTH CAROLINA (1848).
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United States in a trio of South Carolina slander cases,79
beginning with the late-eighteenth-century case of Eden v.
Legare, ° in which the highest court of South Carolina
established (or simply recognized)8' the rights deprivation
theory of slander per se. 2 Chief Justice John Rutledge of the
Court of Common Pleas and General Sessions of the Peace of
South Carolina (who four years later took office as the Chief
Justice of the United States Supreme Court) held actionable
falsely calling a plaintiff a "mulatto," concluding that under
South Carolina's "Negro Act" of 1740, such an allegation, if
true, would result in the plaintiff being deprived of all civil
rights and the privilege to trial by jury.83 The court carefully
noted that the words "in themselves were, in this country,
actionable"-an earlier way of saying that the language
constituted slander per se, and that plaintiffs would not need
to prove any special damages in order to recover."s Following
Eden v. Legare, South Carolina courts consistently either held
or observed that the general rule was that misidentifying a
white man or woman as a "Negro" or a "Mulatto" was
79. Eden v. Legare, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 171 (Ct. Com. P1. & Gen. Sess. 1791);
Atkinson v. Hartley, 12 S.C.L. (1 McCord) 203, 204 (Const. Ct. App. 1821); King
v. Wood, 10 S.C.L. (1 Nott & McC.) 184 (Const. Ct. App. 1818). These early
South Carolina cases deal with slander, rather than libel; given later decisions
indicating that the laws of libel were more stringent than the laws governing
slander, this suggests that the South Carolina cases may be read as
establishing a broader defamation (rather than simply slander) doctrine.
80. Eden, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 171; see also Axton Fisher Tobacco Co. v. Evening
Post, 183 S.W. 269 (Ky. 1916).
81. Eden v. Legare is the first case that can be found in the reporters, but in
the opinion "RUTLEDGE, Ch. J. mentioned several cases where it had been
formerly held that an action lay for [these sorts of words]." Eden, 1 S.C.L. (1
Bay) at 171.
82. See, e.g., Williams v. Riddle, 140 S.W. 661, 663 (Ky. 1911) ("We are not
entirely without precedents, however .... In some of the early cases in South
Carolina... it was held to be actionable to call a white person a mulatto ....");
Recent Important Decisions, Libel-Publishing of a White Man that He Is
"Colored," 3 MICH. L. REv. 662, 673-74 (1905) (noting incorrectly that "[t]his
point was settled in South Carolina by very early cases and does not seem to
have arisen there since the year 1818").
83. See Eden, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) at 171; see also 7 STATUTES AT LARGE OF
SOUTH CAROLINA 379-417 (David J. McCord, ed., 1840) (reprinting "An Act for
the Better Ordering and Governing Negroes and Other Slaves in this Province,"
often referred to as the "Slave Act" or "Negro Act" of 1740). In his decision, the
Chief Justice "mentioned several cases where it had been formerly held that an
action lay for them .... Any words therefore, which tended to subject a citizen
to such disabilities, were actionable." Eden, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) at 171.
84. See Eden, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) at 171
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actionable per se,11 with (for a time) the general argument
appearing to be that such racial misidentification harmed the
misidentified individual by stripping civil and legal rights
from that individual.8 6
When, thirty years after Eden v. Legare, the South
Carolina Supreme Court next considered whether falsely
labeling a white man a "Mulatto" constituted slander, the
court confirmed the Eden v. Legare rule that "an action might
be maintained for those words, without laying any special
damage," but also hinted at a desire to recognize a theory of
defamation allowing recovery for emotional, rather than
simply rights-based, harm. 7 In King v. Wood, Justice Nott of
the Constitutional Court of Appeals of South Carolina
confirmed that under South Carolina law, calling a white
man a "Mulatto" was actionable per se. 8  In reaching this
decision, Justice Nott seemed oddly conflicted. On the one
hand, he announced that the court had adopted the rule
primarily because of the precedential decision in Eden, and
that otherwise (had that precedent not existed) the question
of whether this characterization should be actionable might
deserve some consideration. 9 On the other hand, Nott noted,
in his view the tort of slander should be expanded "to
85. See, e.g., Smith v. Hamilton, 44 S.C.L. (10 Rich.) 44, 48 (Ct. App. 1856)
("To call a man a mulatto, has been held, from an early period in the history of
our jurisprudence, actionable per se."). In Smith v. Hamilton, the South
Carolina court, appealing to the Eden v. Legare line of cases, addressed a
technical pleading issue in a case in which a jury had awarded damages to a
woman whom the defendant said had a mulatto child. See id. at 44. The
defendant appealed, arguing that in order to sustain an action for slander, the
plaintiff should have included in her pleading a statement that she was white.
Id. The court, however, found that in such slander cases the burden of proving
status, should it become relevant, lies on the defendants. Id. This is not a clear
DPSRM case, as the court noted that the allegation that the plaintiff was
unchaste would have sufficed for an action as well as would an allegation
regarding the race of her child, id., but it demonstrates the acceptance in South
Carolina courts of the general Eden v. Legare rule.
86. In the post-Civil War period, courts began applying the "community
standards" reasoning of defamation generally, not just in cases involving
defamation by racial misidentification. See generally Robert C. Post, The Social
Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution, 74 CAL. L.
REV. 691 (1986).
87. King v. Wood, 10 S.C.L. (1 Nott & McC.) 184 (Const. Ct. App. 1818).
88. Id.
89. See id. ("It is a little extraordinary, that while the law, in every other
respect, is undergoing continual changes to accommodate itself to the modem
state of society, the rules of law by which actions of slander are governed, and
which were established in the most barbarous ages, still remain the same.").
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embrace cases where the greatest injury may be done to the
reputation and feelings of an individual," since if words were
thought slanderous in the context of a past, more barbaric
age, "much more ought they in an age of refinement and
civilization, when the injury done to the feelings constitutes
the greatest part of the offence."9"
With the third case in the South Carolina trio, the South
Carolina high court narrowed and focused the rights
deprivation theory it had established in Eden. However
reluctantly, it affirmed the rule Nott had stated in King by
insisting that plaintiffs present proof that the defendants had
used the specific words necessary (here, a claim that the
plaintiff was actually "mulatto") to trigger a threat of rights
deprivation. 9' In Atkinson, the defendant appealed after a
jury awarded damages to a plaintiff who claimed that the
defendant had called him a "damned mulatto son of a bitch."92
The court, with Justice Johnson writing, found that the
plaintiff had in fact gone into his house to get a gun to fire on
the defendant's son, at which point the defendant,
challenging the plaintiff to come and out and shoot, either
called the plaintiff "a damned mulatto son of a bitch" or "a
damned mulatto looking son of a bitch."93 The court, while
acknowledging that falsely calling a white man a mulatto was
certainly actionable, held that because the witnesses could
not decide which of the two statements the defendant had
made, the jury verdict should therefore be set aside. 94 While
the court appropriately cited the rule in Eden v. Legare,
Justice Johnson seemed anxious to find a way to overturn the
jury verdict-perhaps because he simply sensed that there
was something absurd about the events surrounding the case,
perhaps because he shared some of Justice Nott's unease with
the basic rule, or perhaps because he was interested in
maintaining the logical rigor of the rights deprivation
theory-and so, given that there was no clear evidence in the
judicial record of what had happened, refused to grant the
jury the discretion to determine what had actually been
90. Id.
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said. 95
Apart from the trio of South Carolina cases, there were
only two other reported cases96 in the antebellum South
establishing a cause of action like a per se rule of DRM,
neither of which provided additional support for a general
common law rule establishing the doctrine, and one of which
(the only one decided in a common law state) was similarly
decided on the basis of an unusual and idiosyncratic statute. 97
In the 1844 case of Scott v. Peebles, the Mississippi Supreme
Court held that Alpha Peebles had slandered James Scott by
alleging in a conversation with a third party that Scott "had
negro blood in him."98 Although Peebles' attorney argued on
appeal that "the words are not actionable at common law, and
no special damage is laid,"99 all parties to the case agreed
that the question of whether Peebles had slandered Scott
needed to be decided under Mississippi's slander statute
rather than under the common law.100 The statute in
question eliminated the need for a plaintiff alleging slander to
prove either malicious intent on the part of the speaker or
damages on his own part.1 ' Instead, according to the
statute, "[aill words, which from their usual construction and
common acceptations, are considered as insults, and lead to
violence and breach of the peace, shall hereafter be
actionable." 102 Writing for the court, Chief Justice William
Lewis Sharkey (later Provisional Governor of Mississippi
95. Id.
96. See Dobard v. Nunez, 6 La. Ann. 294 (1851); Scott v. Peebles, 10 Miss. (2
S. & M.) 546 (1844).
97. MISS. CODE ANN. § 1059 (1942); see also Huckabee v. Nash, 183 So. 500,
501-02 (Miss. 1938) (describing the same statute as "Section 11 of the Code of
1930" and citing to Scott, 10 Miss. (2 S. & M.) at 546, for a proper
interpretation); Landrum v. Ellington, 120 So. 444, 445 (Miss. 1929) (noting
that the same statute "has been in force in this state since 1822, and is
generally known as the 'anti-duelling statute' (Hemingway's Code 1927, § 882 et
seq.), the purpose of which is to induce citizens who are maligned and whose
honor is impugned to resort to the courts of the country for redress by money
judgment as a salve for wounded honor rather than to the old-time method of
'pistols and coffee for two'").
98. Scott, 10 Miss. (2 S. & M.) at 546.
99. Id. at 547. Scott's attorney thought that there was so little merit to this
objection that he refused even to address the point. Id. at 550.
100. See, e.g., id. ("This, however, is not an action at the common law."
(Scott's attorney speaking)).
101. See id. (citing H. & H. Dig. 547, § 6); MISS. CODE ANN. § 1059 (1942).
102. Scott, 10 Miss. (2 S. & M.) at 556-57 (citing H. & H. Dig. 547, § 6).
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after the Civil War) focused almost entirely on whether the
plaintiff had pled properly and whether the defendant could
hide behind the fact that he was simply repeating what he
had heard from two out-of-state residents. 10 3  While the
attorneys for both Peebles and Scott addressed the question
of how the action might have fit into the common law,
Sharkey seemed uninterested in the common law
implications--or even common law precedent. 1o4 The result of
Scott was that Peebles was held liable despite there being no
showing of malice on his part or (more importantly for the per
se questions) of damages suffered on Scott's part, but the case
stands more as evidence of the interpretation of the
Mississippi slander statute than as evidence of an intent to
create a common law DPSRM doctrine. 105
Like the Mississippi Supreme Court in Scott, in the 1851
case of Dobard v. Nunez the Louisiana Supreme Court, which
was not governed by common law precedent, concluded that
words of racial misidentification could constitute slander,
even though the speaker uttered the words without malice
and the plaintiff could prove no special damages. 10 6  In
Dobard, the defendant Vincente Nunez repeated an
allegation he had heard that "the families of Martin and
Lafrance are colored people."' 7 While Nunez admitted that
he had uttered the words, he claimed that he did not
originate the allegation and had uttered the words without
malice.0 ' Despite Nunez's defense, there was a judgment
against him for $500, which he appealed. 0 9 Writing for the
court, Judge Pierre Adolphe Rost 10° noted that the evidence
103. See id. at 555-61.
104. See id. at 555-62. Sharkey did not, for instance, cite any cases
regarding this sort of defamation.
105. See, e.g., Natchez Times Publ'g Co. v. Dunigan, 72 So. 2d 681, 683 (Miss.
1954) (distinguishing Scott from a later case in which the Mississippi Supreme
Court decided, for the first time, that publishing of a white person that he or
she was colored constituted libel per se).
106. See Dobard v. Nunez, 6 La. Ann. 294 (1851).
107. Id. at 294. It is not clear how Luc Dobard, the plaintiff, was related to
the "families of Martin and Lafrance." See id. (emphasis omitted). The role
played in this case by a defendant with a Hispanic name is especially
interesting, as it may suggest that the conflicts over racial defamation in the
South were not limited to Caucasians and African Americans.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Judge Rost was not a native Southerner, but was instead a French-born
veteran of the Napoleonic wars. As such, he might have been more wedded to
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on the merits was conflicting."' "[O]n the principle that has
uniformly guided our decisions in such cases," Rost added,
presumably referring to the Louisiana Supreme Court's
desire not to overturn a lower-court factual decision unless
the evidence on the merits was clear and compelling, "we
cannot reverse the judgment."" 2  Still, he concluded, the
court thought that Dobard was entitled only to nominal
damages, as Nunez did not originate the slander and acted
without malice, and (more importantly) as "there is nothing
in the record to show that the plaintiffs were in any manner
injured by what he said."1 13  Dobard thus may stand for
the proposition that, in Louisiana, words of racial
misidentification could, even in the absence of malice on the
part of the speaker or the showing of special (or any)
damages, constitute slander-in effect, a per se defamation
rule. The Louisiana Supreme Court here did not, however,
seem particularly anxious to create doctrine or announce a
general rule. Given the nature of the Louisiana Civil Code," 4
Dobard should not be read as somehow embracing a common
law rule or bringing into the common law any rule
establishing such a doctrine.
The four antebellum cases in which courts in South
Carolina and Mississippi found it slanderous to say of a white
man that he was colored, Mulatto, or "had Negro blood"
demonstrate that these courts had essentially created a
statutory doctrine of defamation per se by racial
misidentification." 1  The words at issue in Eden, King,
the principle of equality and less wedded to the Southern views on race and
slavery than were his fellow judges-although he did marry into one of the most
prominent families in Louisiana. During the Civil War, Rost served as the
Confederacy's ambassador to Spain. See Michael F. Knight, The Rost Home
Colony, St. Charles Parish, Louisiana, PROLOGUE MAG., Fall 2001, at 214-20,
available at http://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/2001/fall/rost-home-
colony.html. Upon his return to the United States after the war, Rost
obtained a pardon from Andrew Johnson and successfully recovered his
property, the famous Destrahan Plantation. See id.; Destrahan Plantation,
http://www.destrehanplantation.org/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2009).
111. Dobard, 6 La. Ann. at 294.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See infra Part II.D.
115. What is most surprising about these cases is that there were only four
(or perhaps five) of them. It is possible that-as C. Vann Woodward, the great
historian of the South, argued-race relations were actually less contentious in
the antebellum South, because social and racial lines were more clearly
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Atkinson, and Scott would not have been actionable in
themselves under the common law. Under the unusual and
idiosyncratic law codes of South Carolina and Mississippi,
however, such words were actionable without any showing of
malice on the part of the speaker or of damages on the part of
the target, and so were in effect defamatory per se. Courts in
the late nineteenth century and throughout the early
twentieth century would repeatedly refer back to the Eden
line of cases (though less often to the Mississippi decision in
Scott) in supporting or considering DPSRM decisions." 6  In
the antebellum period, however, jurisdictions without South
Carolina's or Mississippi's unusual statutory provisions (and
without the freedom from precedent afforded by Louisiana's
idiosyncratic relations with the common law) proved
unwilling to embrace this statutory DPSRM doctrine, and
instead relied on traditional common law categories of words
"actionable in themselves." 7
B. Antebellum Rejection of the Statutory "Rights Deprivation"
Theory
In the antebellum period, jurisdictions other than South
Carolina, Mississippi, and Louisiana (which was not bound by
common law precedent) were unable or unwilling to adopt
either South Carolina's Slave-Act-based rights deprivation
theory or Mississippi's slander-statute-based rule effectively
creating a DSPRM doctrine. By the end of the Civil War,
understood and accepted than they were in the Jim Crow era. See generally C.
VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (2d ed. 1955). If so,
then the paucity of these cases suggests that either individuals were not falsely
labeling others as mulattos or Negros (which seems unlikely, given the tenor of
arguments like that litigated in Atkinson v. Hartley, 12 S.C.L. (1 McCord) 203
(Const. Ct. App. 1821), or else the communities did not view such allegations in
the extremely negative light that did communities in societies, such as post-war
South Carolina and the Jim Crow South of the late nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, where possession of African American blood or identity would result
in an automatic loss of civil, if not political and legal, rights. See generally
WOODWARD, supra note 115.
116. See Wright v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 281 Ill. App. 495, 502 (App. Ct.
1935); Williams v. Riddle, 140 S.W. 661, 663 (Ky. 1911); Bowen v. Indep. Publ'g
Co., 96 S.E.2d 564, 564-65 (S.C. 1957); Flood v. News & Courier Co., 50 S.E.
637, 639 (S.C. 1905); Atkinson, 12 S.C.L. (1 McCord) 203; King v. Wood, 10
S.C.L. (1 Nott & McC.) 184, 184 (Const. Ct. App. 1818).
117. See, e.g., Johnson v. Brown, 13 F. Cas. 734 (C.C.D.C. 1832) (No. 7375);
Barrett v. Jarvis, 1 Tapp. 244, 244-47 (5th Cir. Ohio 1818); McDowell v. Bowles,
53 N.C. (8 Jones) 184 (1860).
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with the abolition of slavery (and so necessarily of South
Carolina's Slave Act of 1740), the rights deprivation doctrine
of DPSRM was clearly no longer viable under the common
law (as opposed to statutory law) in any state in the Union. 118
The doctrine would therefore require the creation of a new
theory of defamation and an act of legal sleight-of-hand or a
simple legal error" 9 to bring the doctrine into being once
more. 1
20
While the few cases of tortious racial misidentification
arising in South Carolina (and Mississippi) before the Civil
War clearly established important precedent for later
Southern courts considering whether racial misidentification
should establish tort liability, at least three courts--one
federal, one a Southern state court, and one a Western state
court-in the antebellum period rejected, ignored, or perhaps
danced around South Carolina's contention that referring to a
white man as "mulatto" or presumably "non-white" was
defamatory per se.121 In the earliest of these cases, Barrett v.
118. The abolition of South Carolina's Slave Act of 1740, of course, had no
effect on Mississippi's slander statute. Even after the rejection by other
Southern states of the rights deprivation theory of defamation per se by racial
misidentification, states with similar slander statutes (i.e., statutes that did not
require that plaintiffs show that they had suffered any sort of damages as a
result of the uttered or written words) might have adopted Mississippi's
reasoning. At least two other states (West Virginia and Virginia) had statutes
that were identical to Mississippi's. See William L. Prosser, Insult and Outrage,
44 CAL. L. REV. 40, 46 (1956) ("It is only under the old statutes in Mississippi,
Virginia, and West Virginia, which had their origin as part of an antidueling
code, and which provide an action for 'all words which . . . are considered as
insults, and lead to violence and breach of the peace,' that such an action will
lie.") (footnote omitted); see also MISS. CODE ANN. § 1059 (1942); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8-630 (1950); W. VA. CODE § 55-7-2 (1955). A number of states, including
Arkansas and Oklahoma, had similar statutes. See, e.g., Morris v. State, 160
S.W. 387 (Ark. 1913); Collins v. Okla. State Hosp., 184 P. 946 (Okla. 1916).
Courts in Virginia, Arkansas, and Oklahoma did not use these statutes to
consider DSPRM decisions until the early twentieth century. See infra Part
II.E.
119. See, e.g., MANGUM, supra note 42, at 20 ("All this would lead one to
believe that a holding that such language is slanderous per se is not in
accordance with the accepted principles of the common law.").
120. See infra Part II.C.
121. See, e.g., Barrett, 1 Tapp. at 244-47; Johnson, 13 F. Cas. 734; McDowell,
53 N.C. (8 Jones) 184. Perhaps the most unusual fact is that the North
Carolina court simply ignored the South Carolina doctrine. It is possible,
though it seems unlikely, that the North Carolina court in McDowell was simply
unaware of South Carolina's Eden v. Legare line of cases. It is also possible that
this decision was part of a desperate attempt on the North Carolina court's part
to try to forestall the coming interstate conflict.
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Jarvis, decided by the Fifth Circuit of Ohio in 1818, Thomas
Barrett brought suit against John Jarvis, alleging that Jarvis
had slandered him by saying to a third person: "I understand
that you are going to marry one of Barrett's daughters; I am
sorry you should, for they are akin to negroes." 22 After
considering the common law rule for slander,'23 and without
citing Eden v. Legare, Chief Judge (and later United States
Senator) Benjamin Tappan of the Ohio Fifth Circuit Court of
Common Pleas engaged in what seems to modern eyes to be a
highly moralistic and even patriotic argument.'24 "If the
action does not lie for imputing a want of moral virtue,"
Tappan asked rhetorically, "can it lie for imputing a
consanguinity for any particular race of men?"'25 There could
be no action specifically because members of the "negro race"
were slaves, Tappan concluded, for "who can be sure that no
one of his ancestors was bought and sold like the cattle of a
feudal Lord?" 2 6  Similarly, he suggested, it could not lie
simply because a Negro was black, because then an action
would lie for suggesting that individuals are kin to
Brazilians, Californians, Laplanders, and Greenlanders, "who
are all of a swarthy hue."'27 Finally, Tappan concluded that
action could not lie simply because blacks and mulattoes are
subject to legal disabilities-even though one of Barrett's
arguments had been that Jarvis's comments had effectively
disenfranchised Barrett. 28  "[Ilf the law of slander is to be
122. Barrett, 1 Tapp. at 244.
123. Under the laws of Ohio, an action for slander would only lie against a
person who "falsely and maliciously" spoke of another "words which directly
charge him with any crime, for the commission of which, the offender is
punishable by law, or with having any contagious disorder, the imputation of
which may exclude him from society." Id. at 245 (citing 2d Selwyns N.P. 1157).
Slander did not, however, lie for "an imputation of the mere defect or want of
moral virtue." Id. (citing 3d Wils. 177-5 Johns. 191).
124. "We live under a government, which recognizes the natural equality of
man, which by a fundamental law, hath preserved us from the dangers and the
curse of slavery," Tappan wrote, "and, as a magistrate in a free commonwealth,
I will never sanction any doctrine which directly or indirectly contravenes that
principle on which our Government rests, that all men are created free and
equal." Id. at 247.
128. Id. at 245.
126. Id. at 246.
127. Id.
128. In failing to subscribe to a rights deprivation theory Tappan might have
been acting incorrectly in a legal sense. While Ohio did not have South
Carolina's antebellum Slave Act of 1740, Ohio law did apparently provide for
the disenfranchisement of Blacks. See Barrett v. Jarvis, 1 Tapp. 244, 246 (5th
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thus extended," Tappan observed, directly attacking the sort
of reasoning that judges in Louisiana and other Southern
states would later use to justify finding racial
misidentification to be defamatory per se, "I do not see where
we are to stop; we may have actions of slander for calling
persons Irish, or French, or Yankees, if persons who are so
called, feel their pride and self-importance wounded by the
imputation."129
Barrett should not be read too broadly, however; despite
his stirring rhetoric, and despite his own clear predilection
against such an inherently racist doctrine, Tappan may not
have been explicitly rejecting the DSPRM doctrine, and might
instead have been dancing around the issue. A close analysis
of Tappan's opinion suggests that he rejected any sort of
rights deprivation argument because the plaintiff in this case
alleged that he had been defamed because his daughters were
described as being "akin" to Negros. 130  Even if it were true
that Barrett's daughters were akin to Negros, under the laws
of Ohio Barrett's own status as an elector would have been
unaffected provided that he himself was White.1 3' Put
another way, Tappan's opinion suggests that in a different
case, in which the plaintiff alleged that he himself had been
falsely described as non-white, Tappan would have, however
reluctantly, had to reach a different conclusion.
In Johnson v. Brown, decided in 1832, the famed Chief
Judge William Cranch of the Federal Circuit Court for the
District of Columbia 13' rejected the DSPRM doctrine when he
announced, after considering the South Carolina trio of Eden,
Cir. Ohio 1818) ("Is it because blacks and mulattoes, are subject to legal
disabilities that a person must be a free white male to be an elector?").
129. Id. Gilbert Thomas Stephenson offered an unconvincing explanation for
Tappan's decision, noting that "the only explanation, apparently, of this conflict
between the decisions of South Carolina and Ohio is that in the latter State it
was not considered as much an insult to impute Negro blood to a white man as
in the former." STEPHENSON, supra note 42, at 27.
130. Barrett, 1 Tapp. at 244.
131. Id. at 246 ("Is it because ... the imputation of being of kin to negroes
might tend to deprive a man of the elective franchise? [Ilt cannot be; because it
is no slander to say of a man that he is not a qualified elector, as it would be to
say of a woman that she is not a free white male.").
132. Cranch was the nephew of John Adams, and the defining figure in the
early history of the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia. He served on the
court for fifty-four years, forty-nine of them as Chief Judge. While Chief Judge,
he swore in two presidents, John Tyler and Millard Fillmore, each of whom
assumed the presidency upon the deaths of his predecessor.
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King, and Atkinson, 133 that a statement that the plaintiff was
"a yellow negro, son of a bitch, a villain, and a liar" did not
constitute defamation per se because, unlike in the South
Carolina cases, saying so "does not subject him [the plaintiffi
to any arrest to which a white man is not equally liable."1 3 4
The words "contain no imputation of crime, nor of moral
turpitude," Cranch noted, "and mere words of disgrace, unless
written and published, are not actionable." 35  Cranch
distinguished Eden v. Legare and its fellows on the grounds
that "by the laws of South Carolina, a mulatto is deprived of
all his civil rights, and liable to be tried, in all cases, without
a jury."136 By concluding that no similar principle governed
Johnson, Cranch explicitly rejected the notion that the South
Carolina cases had brought the doctrine of DSPRM into the
common law. 137
With Barrett v. Jarvis decided by an Ohio court and
Johnson v. Brown decided by a Federal circuit court, it was
not until the 1860 North Carolina case of McDowell v. Bowels,
decided almost on the eve of the Civil War, that a Southern
state supreme court held that under the common law it was
not actionable per se to say of a white man that he was a "free
Negro." 13 In McDowell, the plaintiff, a Baptist minister and
"clear blooded white man," claimed that at an election the
defendant said that the plaintiff, being a "free negro," had no
right to vote. 139 The lower court ordered a nonsuit, holding
that the words did not constitute slander per se, and the
plaintiff appealed.140 In a per curiam ruling, the court noted
that words actionable per se usually fell into three categories:
"(1) words that impute a crime or a misdemeanor, punishable
by an infamous penalty; (2) words that impute a contagious




137. Cranch decided Johnson before either Scott v. Peebles, 10 Miss. (2 S. &
M.) 546 (1844), or Dobard v. Nunez, 6 La. Ann. 294 (1851), and so could not
have taken those decisions into account.
138. The ruling irritated at least one early twentieth century Southern
scholar. STEPHENSON, supra note 42, at 27 ("In North Carolina, in 1860, there
was the surprising decision that it was not actionable per se to call a white man
a free Negro, even though the white man was a minister of the gospel."
(emphasis added)).
139. McDowell v. Bowles, 53 N.C. (8 Jones) 184 (1860).
140. Id.
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disease, by which the party impugned would be excluded from
society; and (3) words derogatory to one in respect of his
office, profession, or calling."' As calling a white man a
"free negro" obviously did not constitute either a crime or a
disease "of a loathsome or pestilential nature,"' the only
remaining possibility was that the words would fall into the
third category. The court held that they did not because the
offensive language was not spoken of the plaintiff "in respect
to his calling," as the words bore no relationship to the
plaintiffs position as a minister. 14 3
By rejecting or ignoring South Carolina's line of cases
regarding DRM (or something like DPSRM), North Carolina
signaled that South Carolina's rights deprivation theory
might find little support outside the context of South
Carolina's unique antebellum law1" stripping all civil rights
from non-whites. At the end of the short ruling in McDowell,
Judge Manly noted that the three categories he had described
comprised all of defamation per se, and that in order to prove
any other claim of defamation, plaintiffs would otherwise
need to show special damages. 14  McDowell, while it
appeared to Gilbert Thomas Stephenson to be an anomaly in
light of the Eden v. Legare line of cases and the later
Louisiana and South Carolina cases, 146 actually serves to
clarify the state of the doctrine.'47 South Carolina had been
acting imprecisely and confusing common law distinctions
between words actionable in themselves and words not
141. Id. at 185.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See O'NEALL, supra note 78.
145. McDowell, 53 N.C. (8 Jones) at 185 ("Thus stands the law, as we
conceive, in respect to words alleged to be actionable of themselves; with respect
to all other disparaging words, outside of the limitation prescribed, special
damage must be alleged and proved."). Interestingly, at the beginning of his
opinion, Judge Manly suggested that the court was not entirely clear about
which classes of words were actionable per se, and that to answer this question
the court needed to turn to "elementary books." Id. ("We are not aware of any
class of defamatory words, which are held to be actionable, that would embrace
the language complained of in this case. The three classes most usually found
in elementary books, are ....").
146. STEPHENSON, supra note 42, at 27.
147. McDowell was not an aberration: in 1926, the North Carolina Supreme
Court explicitly followed its holding in finding that the defendant was not liable
for slander per se for alleging that the plaintiff had "negro blood in his veins."
Deese v. Collins, 133 S.E. 92 (N.C. 1926).
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actionable in themselves by referring to the potentially
defamatory words in Eden, Atkinson, and King as "actionable
in themselves."14  In fact, the South Carolinian rights
deprivation theory did not create new categories of words
actionable in themselves, but effectively codified-within
South Carolina-one method of proving special damages
(showing that the Negro Act would strip civil rights from non-
whites). As North Carolina had no statute equivalent to the
Negro Act of 1740, a rights deprivation theory should have
had no effect on the outcome of any action for slander in the
North Carolina courts. In other words, both the North
Carolina Supreme Court and the South Carolina Supreme
Court correctly applied precedent in reaching their respective
rulings, even though the courts reached opposite conclusions,
and even though the South Carolina courts unnecessarily
confused their legal terms.
Beginning at least by 1791, and continuing well into the
nineteenth century, South Carolina's courts recognized that
words falsely or mistakenly alleging racial identification
constituted words "actionable in themselves." Despite the
development of this South Carolina doctrine (and despite
similar cases from Mississippi and Louisiana), however, as
Ohio, District of Columbia, and North Carolina courts
demonstrated, the logic of the South Carolina Supreme Court
was so idiosyncratic, and so dependent upon the existence in
South Carolina of a unique statute (the Negro Act of 1740),
that other Southern courts applying traditional common law
understandings of defamation per se were unlikely to follow
in South Carolina's footsteps. The nascent tort doctrine
of DPSRM might have lost all legal legitimacy at this
point, especially after the post-Civil War Reconstruction
Amendments granted equal political and legal rights to
African Americans, had not Louisiana, in a radical move,
used the "community standards" theory of defamation once
again to find (outside of the context of special defamation
statutes 149 ) racial misidentification to be defamatory-at least
148. Atkinson v. Hartley, 12 S.C.L. (1 McCord) 203, 204 (Const. Ct. App.
1821); King v. Wood, 10 S.C.L. (1 Nott & McC.) 184 (Const. Ct. App. 1818); Eden
v. Legare, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 171 (Ct. Com. P1. & Gen. Sess. 1791). The
Mississippi court in Scott did not make the same mistake.
149. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 1059 (1942); VA. CODE ANN. § 8-630 (1950);
W. VA. CODE § 55-7-2 (1955); infra Part II.E.
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in Southern racist communities.
C. Struggling with Equality: Establishing the "Community
Standards" Model
After the Civil War, Louisiana resurrected the doctrine of
defamation per se by racial misidentification by abandoning
the rights deprivation theory and developing a "community
standards" theory of DRM, under which words might be
deemed defamatory if, given a particular community's "social
habits, customs, and prejudices," 150 the words lowered the
target in the eyes of that community. Louisiana would not
have been able to adopt this different standard for defamation
were it, like North Carolina, 151 operating under English and
American common law. Because Louisiana was operating
under the Napoleonic or Civil Code, however, the Louisiana
Supreme Court was free to ignore traditional common law
distinctions between words actionable in themselves
(defamatory per se) and words actionable only upon a
showing of special damages (not defamatory per se), and so
ignore the North Carolina Supreme Court's common law logic
in McDowell. 52
Even after the end of the Civil War, the Louisiana
Supreme Court was apparently in no rush to create a doctrine
resembling the DSPRM rule. In the 1869 case of Toye
v. McMahon, the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed a
lower court's decision on narrow factual grounds, and so
sidestepped the question of whether a defendant had
slandered the plaintiff by falsely informing the Hackmen's
Benevolent Association of New Orleans, an association which
the plaintiff hoped to join, that the plaintiff "was a colored
man."151 Louis Toye, a "British subject of pure white, or
Caucassian [sic] blood," claimed that he had suffered the loss
of five thousand dollars by being "disgracefully expelled from
the association" as a result of Thomas McMahon's false
allegation. 5 1 McMahon countered that at a preliminary
organizing meeting setting up the Association other members
150. See, e.g., Spotorno v. Fourichon, 4 So. 71, 71 (La. 1888).
151. See McDowell v. Bowles, 53 N.C. (8 Jones) 184 (1860).
152. Id. The Louisiana Supreme Court, in deciding later cases, generally did
not cite to or consider McDowell.
153. Toye v. McMahon, 21 La. Ann. 308 (1869).
154. Id.
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had encouraged him to call attention to the plaintiffs race,
because eight years earlier Toye had been denied entry into
the then Hackmen's Association for being colored. 5 5  In
reaching its decision, the Louisiana Supreme Court
essentially decided to defer to the District Judge, noting that
the lower court judge's opinion might have been influenced by
the fact that the plaintiff was simply denied entry into (rather
than expelled from) the association.5 6 The record, moreover,
the court explained, did "not seem to prove conclusively that
the defendant uttered the language complained of and with
the intent charged."'57  Judge Howe's extremely narrow
opinion for the court is, in the end, remarkable for its lack of
legal analysis regarding slander or defamation, though the
facts in this case certainly seemed to call for discussion of
these issues. In the aftermath of the Civil War, the Supreme
Court of Louisiana had perhaps not yet fully decided how to
handle the doctrine of DRM158-an indecision it rectified
within two years of sidestepping the issue in Toye.
With its 1888 decision in Spotorno v. Fourichon, the
Louisiana Supreme Court, while referring to its opinion in
Toye, established the basic "community standards" doctrine of
DRM that would continue to govern cases through the middle
of the twentieth century. 19 In Spotorno, the court was
considering the defendant August Fourichon's appeal from a
judgment for $500 resulting from a suit by Louis Spotorno,
who alleged that Fourichon had "falsely and maliciously
assert[ed] and circulat[ed] the report that [Spotornol was a
negro." 60 Writing for the court, Judge Fenner first made the
vital point that Louisiana courts were "not bound by the
technical distinctions of the common law as to words
155. See id.
156. Id.
157. Id. (emphasis added).
158. It would be equally appropriate to refer to this as a DSPRM case, as in
Louisiana there was no distinction between defamation per se and simple
defamation.
159. The case proved important both as a window into how the Louisiana
courts viewed race and as a reflection of the views of Judge Fenner, the author
of the opinion, who went on in 1893 to write the Louisiana Supreme Court
opinion in what would come to be the far better known case of Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1897). See Thomas J. Davis, More Than Segregation,
Racial Identity: The Neglected Question in Plessy v. Ferguson, 10 WASH. & LEE
RACE & ETHNIC ANC. L.J. 1, 13-14 (2004).
160. Spotorno v. Fourichon, 4 So. 71, 71 (La. 1888).
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actionable per se and not actionable per se, and allowing, for
the latter, only actual pecuniary damages specially proved." 161
Here, Fenner was explicitly refusing to use the sort of point-
by-point analysis of defamation per se that the North
Carolina Supreme Court had used when deciding McDowell
in 1860.162 Having made this point, Fenner turned to the
question of whether Fourichon's words should be considered
defamatory: in Louisiana, Fenner concluded, it was sufficient
that words be "false, injurious, and made maliciously or malo
animo."1 3 The injury and the maliciousness, he added, could
be inferred from the nature and falsity of the words, and from
the circumstances under which they were uttered without the
necessity of special proof. In this case, the court held that
there was no need to go any further than considering the fact
that the statement was actually uttered. "Under the social
habits, customs, and prejudices prevailing in Louisiana,"
Fenner noted:
[It cannot be disputed that charging a white man with
being a negro is calculated to inflict injury and damage.
We are concerned with these social conditions simply as
facts. They exist and, for that reason, we deal with them.
No one could make such a charge, knowing it to be false,
without understanding that its effect would be injurious,
and without intending to injure. 164
Despite Fenner's observation that the Louisiana court
was unconcerned with the distinction between words that
were actionable per se and those that were not, this opinion
reads instead like a straightforward claim that malicious
racial misidentification could always be actionable per se in
Louisiana. In other words, had Fenner been writing within
the context of the sort of logic demonstrated by the North
Carolina Supreme Court's opinion in McDowell, then, rather
than abandoning the three traditional categories described in
McDowell, he might simply have been expanding defamation
161. Id. Put another way, Fenner was reminding his audience that
Louisiana, which was governed by the Civil Code, was not subject to the rules
and precedents of common law.
162. See McDowell v. Bowles, 53 N.C. (8 Jones) 184 (1860). The Louisiana
Supreme Court in Spotorno did not cite to McDowell explicitly, but clearly
sought to avoid the difficulties imposed by contending with common law
categories of words actionable in themselves. See Spotorno, 4 So. at 71.
163. Spotorno, 4 So. at 71.
164. Id.
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per se into a fourth category-words which, under the social
habits, customs, and prejudices prevailing in a particular
state, were calculated to inflict injury and damage. Such a
reading ignores the crucial fact that Fenner, working within
the confines of the Louisiana Civil Code, was not functioning
as a common law judge when he wrote the opinion, and so
should have had no more effect on common law definitions of
per se liability than would a French judge deciding a similar
issue. 165  Despite this crucial fact, Fenner's pseudo-per se
community standards theory of tortious defamation by racial
misidentification was later adopted by numerous Southern
courts, even in states that had no case on point. 166 In doing
so, these courts-following the example of South
Carolina 161-were arguably making a significant legal error
by incorporating into the common law a Louisiana decision,
reached under the logic not of the common law but rather of
Louisiana's idiosyncratic Civil Code. 161
Having firmly established the community standards
theory of effective DPSRM in Spotorno, in 1900 the Louisiana
Supreme Court moved to clarify what exactly it meant by
suggesting that injury for racial misidentification would
depend upon the social habits, customs, and prejudices of a
particular community and could be inferred from the
circumstances. 169  In Upton v. Times-Democrat Publishing
Co., the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed a lower court
decision limiting the plaintiff, Thomas J. Upton, to actual
damages of fifty dollars suffered as a result of libel by racial
165. As a result of the confusion engendered by interaction between the
common law and civil code systems, it is not always clear whether the Louisiana
courts were talking about the doctrine of DRM or the more stringent doctrine of
DPSRM. For the purposes of this article, Louisiana's theory as of Spotorno will
be referred to as "effective DPSRM."
166. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Dallas Cotton Exch., 153 S.W.2d 266, 268 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1941) (citing Spotorno, 4 So. at 71) ("Although we have no Texas case
[on point,] . . . in view of the social habits, customs, traditions and prejudices
prevalent in this state, in regard to the status of whites and blacks, we think
such a charge would be slanderous.").
167. See infra Part II.D.
168. While Fenner's opinion in Spotorno is normatively repellant to modem
sensibilities, this article does not contend that Fenner made any particular legal
error in building his community standards theory. Instead, this article suggests
that other states, led by South Carolina, erred by failing to account for
Louisiana's different legal system when using Spotorno to justify later
defamation per se by racial misidentification decisions.
169. See Spotorno, 4 So. at 71.
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misidentification.17 °  Upton had brought suit for $5,000
against the Times-Democrat after the paper published what
purported to be a telegraph message from one of its
correspondents in which the correspondent stated that
"the Rev. Thos. J. Upton is a negro."'71  In fact, the
correspondent-reporting on a speech Upton had given' 72-
had noted complimentarily in his report that Upton was "a
cultured gentleman," and that Upton's arguments were
eloquently presented.173 "The word 'cultured,' as written by
this correspondent," explained the court, "was changed to
'colored'; and the dispatch read that a 'colored gentleman,'
instead of a 'cultured gentleman,' had presented the
petition."1 74  The Times-Democrat, upon receiving the
incorrect telegraph message, changed "colored gentleman" to
"negro," as was its editorial policy. Upton immediately
complained, and the newspaper printed a retraction two days
later, on September 15, 1900, stating that Upton "was of the
purest Caucasian race" and had held respected positions in
the community.'75 While explicitly not discounting in any
way the damage or injury caused by the publication,'76 the
Louisiana Supreme Court, basing its decision on the
conclusion that the newspaper had not acted maliciously,
agreed with the lower court that Upton should be restricted to
recovering actual damages. 7 7  The mistake, the court
concluded, was one for which the defendant was in no way
responsible; the newspaper had merely changed "colored" to
"negro," and "one expression ... was as objectionable as the
other."'78 Without malicious intent, there was "no question of
170. Upton v. Times-Democrat Publ'g Co., 28 So. 970, 972 (La. 1900).
171. Id.
172. In this speech, Upton advocated that the parish of East Baton Rouge




175. Id. at 970-71.
176. See Upton v. Times-Democrat Publ'g Co., 28 So. 970, 971 (La. 1900)
("The word complained of was provoking, to an extreme degree. Inserted as it
was in one of the daily papers, it was enough to arouse the most profound
indignation of the most patient man.").
177. See id. at 972.
178. Id. at 971. It was the telegraph company, unnamed in this suit, which
had committed the (in the court's eyes) far more egregious error of changing
"cultured" to "colored." Id.
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exemplary damages"; 179 the only remaining question was
what amount of actual damages Upton deserved as a result of
the injury to his reputation. In other words, the only
remaining question was how much of an injury, given the
social habits, customs, and prejudices of Upton's community,
the Louisiana Supreme Court thought racial misidentification
had inflicted.
Upton is more interesting for the reasoning the court
used to limit the actual damages to fifty dollars than it is for
its legal analysis, as it does not signal any change from the
basic "community standards" model of DRM the Louisiana
Supreme Court established in Spotorno. In Spotorno, the
court had signaled that the injury caused by racial
misidentification should be judged by "social habits, customs,
and prejudice." 80  In Upton, however, the court concluded
that in its view, the real injury sustained must have been
"very inconsiderable."' 8 1 Applying questionable logic, the
court noted:
The untruth published could not have had the least effect,
even for a moment. To illustrate: [ilf one who has marked
moral character, great prestige, and austere probity is
accidentally charged with having committed an improper
act, the charge, as relates to actual damages, would have
no great effect, or if, as in the case before us for decision,
the name of one of well-known lineage should, by the
merest accident, be characterized untruthfully, the actual
damages would be inconsiderable.'
82
The court might have been depending upon its belief that
Upton's being of the "purest Caucasian race" was so well
known, that no reader perusing the Times-Democrat could
possibly have believed otherwise. This seems less than fully
persuasive, however, especially given the court's statement
that "the word complained of was provoking, to an extreme
degree." 183 Judge Breaux, writing the opinion, may in fact
have not believed that mistaken racial misidentification truly
constituted much of an injury under any circumstances.
In the aftermath of the Civil War, and in light of the
179. Id.
180. Spotorno v. Fourichon, 4 So. 71, 71 (La. 1888).
181. Upton, 28 So. at 971.
182. Id. at 971-72.
183. Id. at 971.
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North Carolina Supreme Court's ruling in McDowell,
Louisiana reconsidered, resurrected, and then clarified the
doctrine of effective DPSRM by establishing a community
standards model and test for the tort. With its decision in
Upton, the Louisiana Supreme Court established that, within
Louisiana, racial misidentification constituted an automatic
tort, provided that the social habits, customs, and prejudices
of the injured party's community suggested that non-whites
were socially lower than were whites. To this point, these
post-Civil War rulings were confined to Louisiana; in the
early years of the twentieth century, however, the South
Carolina Supreme Court seized upon the Louisiana court's
logic, and so erroneously brought the community standards
doctrine of defamation per se by racial misidentification
firmly into the common law.
D. South Carolina and Louisiana: Developing the
"Community Standards" Model
In the early twentieth century the South Carolina
Supreme Court erroneously or improperly brought the
community standards doctrine of DSPRM into the common
law"8 by using the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in
184. In making this point, it is important to remember Justice Holmes's
famous dissent in Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow
Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting):
Books written about any branch of the common law treat it as a
unit, cite cases from this Court, from the Circuit Courts of Appeal, from
the State Courts, from England and the Colonies of England
indiscriminately, and criticize them as right or wrong according to the
writer's notion of a single theory. It is very hard to resist the
impression that there is one august corpus, to understand which
clearly is the only task of any Court concerned. If there were such a
transcendental body of law outside of any particular State but
obligatory within it unless and until changed by statute, the Courts of
the United States might be right in using their independent judgment
as to what it was. But there is no such body of law.... The common
law so far as it is enforced in a State, whether called common law or
not, is not the common law generally but the law of that State existing
by the authority of that State without regard to what may have been in
England or anywhere else .... But a general adoption of it does not
prevent the State Courts from refusing to follow the English decisions
upon a matter where the local conditions are different.... Louisiana is
a living proof that it need not be adopted at all .... Whether and how
far and in what sense a rule shall be adopted whether called common
law or Kentucky law is for the State alone to decide.
Id. at 533-34. See also Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)
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Spotorno as precedent for finding words falsely identifying
whites as non-whites actionable in themselves (and thus
defamatory per se) in any community in which the prevailing
social habits, customs, and prejudices suggested that non-
whites were somehow socially lower than were whites. In
three cases between 1900 and 1910-Upton,"' Flood v. News
& Courier Co.,186 and May v. Shreveport Traction Co. 18 7-the
Louisiana and South Carolina Supreme Courts jointly
advanced and perhaps clarified the doctrine of defamation per
se by racial misidentification. 188
In 1905, the South Carolina Supreme Court effectively
brought the doctrine of DSPRM (actually libel per se in this
case) firmly into the common law when it erroneously called
upon the Louisiana Supreme Court's decisions in Spotorno
and Upton to justify a community standards theory of the
tort. In the 1905 case of Flood v. News & Courier Co., the
South Carolina Supreme Court held that the Reconstruction
Amendments had no effect on the social (as opposed to legal
or political) status of African Americans, and therefore in no
("There is no federal general common law."). Despite Holmes's well-founded
observation, it is reasonable to argue that South Carolina's Supreme Court
acted in a questionable fashion by finding a common law rule holding racial
misidentification libel per se, when it did so by looking solely or primarily to
Louisiana precedent. In other words, South Carolina's Supreme Court might
have had a stronger argument had the court looked to "standard practice,"
"tradition from time immemorial," or the like. Instead, Supreme Court
specifically and improperly looked to Louisiana Civil Code precedent.
185. Upton, 28 So. 970.
186. Flood v. News & Courier Co., 50 S.E. 637, 638 (S.C. 1905).
187. May v. Shreveport Traction Co., 53 So. 671, 673 (La. 1910).
188. During the same period, the newly-created Georgia Court of Appeals
also weighed in with a judgment that calling a white man a negro, or intimating
that a white man is of African descent may, under certain circumstances, be
actionable per se. See Wolfe v. Ga. Ry. & Elec. Co., 58 S.E. 899, 903 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1907). Wolfe implicates racial misidentification in places of public
accommodation more than it does racial misidentification in a defamation
context, because the issue in the case dealt with the humiliation that the
plaintiff felt at being treated as a non-white, rather than being directly called
non-white. The ruling regarding directly calling a white man black was thus
essentially dicta. But see, e.g., S. Ry. Co. v. Thurman, 90 S.W. 240, 241 (Ky.
1906) ("When a mistake is made, the carrier is not liable in damages simply
because a white person was taken for a negro, or vice versa. It is not a legal
injury for a white person to be taken for a negro."). Also during the same
period, at least one Northern court, in finding that saying of a woman that she
was "only a low woman" and "half negress" did not imply unchastity to her,
essentially rejected the claim that such allegations constituted slander per se.
See Kenworthy v. Brown, 92 N.Y.S. 34, 35 (App. Div. 1904).
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way interfered with the continued viability of the tort of
DRM.' 89 Augustus M. Flood had sued the News and Courier
Co. after the newspaper published an article reporting on a
lawsuit by Flood against the Charleston Consolidated
Railway, Gas & Electric Company. 190 In describing the
action, and giving Flood's name, the newspaper began by
noting that "Augustus M. Flood, colored, through attorneys"
had filed the suit. 191 Flood alleged that through this language
the newspaper had injured him in his reputation and had
hurt him in his feelings.192 The district judge sustained the
defendant's demurrer that under the Thirteenth, Fourteenth,
and Fifteenth Amendments the use of the word "colored"
could not be libelous or defamatory. 193 The South Carolina
Supreme Court thus took up the sole question of whether it
was "libelous per se to publish a white man as a negro."194
In answering this question, whether racial
misidentification constituted defamation per se, Chief Judge
Pope appealed directly to and built upon the "community
standards" theory laid out by the Louisiana Supreme Court in
Spotorno and Upton.195 Pope first reached back to the United
States Supreme Court's 1880 opinion in Strauder v. West
Virginia,196 in which the Court, while holding that preventing
African Americans from serving on juries violated the Equal
Protection clause, held that the Reconstruction amendments
were "designed to accord the members of the negro race the
189. See Flood v. News & Courier Co., 50 S.E. 637. See also Flood v. Evening
Post Publ'g Co., 50 S.E. 641 (S.C. 1905). This case was handed down on the
same day and simply restated the result of Flood v. News & Courier Co.




194. Id. at 639.
195. See, e.g., id. at 639-40 (citing Spotorno v. Fourichon, 4 So. 71 (La. 1888))
(discussing its "social habits, customs, and prejudices" analysis). See also id.
(citing Upton v. Times-Democrat Publ'g Co., 28 So. 970 (La. 1900)). In Flood v.
News & Courier Co., while Chief Judge Pope wrote a powerful opinion
supporting the community standards theory, his three fellow judges simply
concurred "in the result, as the complaint alleges that the publication was
willful and malicious." Id. at 641. This later became an important issue when a
lower-court judge in South Carolina in the 1950s read Flood narrowly as
rejecting the doctrine of defamation per se by racial misidentification. The
South Carolina Supreme Court in that case rejected the lower-court judge's
reasoning entirely. Bowen v. Indep. Publ'g Co., 96 S.E.2d 564, 565 (S.C. 1957).
196. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
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same protection in life, liberty, and property which were
already enjoyed by the white race."197 Citing Justice Strong's
contention in Strauder that "[t]he colored race, as a race, was
abject and ignorant, and that condition was unfit to command
the respect of those who had superior intelligence," 198 Pope
argued dismissively199 that the amendments did not touch
social conditions. "What does 'society' mean in this
connection?" Pope asked rhetorically. "Does it not mean the
class with which he mingles; the class from which, if a man
marries, he selects his wife; the class of people with whose
children his children go to school?"200 Holding that that was
the case, Pope then summarized various decisions from the
South Carolina courts upholding laws banning
miscegenation, railroad employees permitting passengers to
occupy cars other than those designated for their own race,
and school desegregation.2 1 Once again reaching back to a
vital United States Supreme Court precedent, Pope quoted
some of the key language in Plessy v. Ferguson: "If the two
races are to meet upon terms of social equality, it must be the
result of natural affinities-a mutual appreciation of each
other's merits and a voluntary consent of individuals."2 2
Referring to the "radical distinction subsisting between the
white man and the black man," Pope stated that to "impute
the condition of the negro to a white man would affect his (the
white man's) social status... [and] would not only be galling
to his pride, but would tend to interfere seriously with the
social relation of the white man to his fellow white men."
20 3
The Reconstruction amendments, he concluded, had not
destroyed the common law of the state making it libelous per
se to call a white man a "negro."20 4
197. Flood v. News & Courier Co., 50 S.E. 639, 639 (citing Strauder, 100 U.S.
at 306).
198. Id. (citing Strauder, 100 U.S. at 306).
199. See id. at 640 ("All take pleasure in bowing to the authority of the
United States in regard to these three amendments, but we would be very far
from admitting that the social distinction subsisting between the two races has
been in any way affected.").
200. Id. at 639.
201. See id.
202. Id. at 640-41 (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1897)).
203. Flood v. News & Courier Co., 50 S.E. 637, 639 (S.C. 1905).
204. Id. at 641. Perhaps erroneously, Pope actually said that the three
amendments "have not destroyed the law of this State, which makes the
publication of a white man as a negro anything but libel." Id. (emphasis added).
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In the first two decades of the twentieth century, the
doctrine of DPSRM developed alongside and was affected by
the related doctrine of tortious racial misidentification in
places of public accommodation (RMPPA), °5 in which white
plaintiffs sued railroads or building owners for being forced to
ride in Jim Crow cars or elevators designated for non-
whites.2" 6 These suits drew doctrine from the line of cases
dating back to Eden v. Legare, but at the same time were
pointed at a different phenomenon than were the tortious
defamation cases. In these tortious RMPPA cases, courts
could reasonably hold that being forced to ride in a Jim Crow
car did not necessarily constitute an injury207-but, as the
doctrine of DSPRM had been firmly set on its way by the
Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in Spotorno-with South
Carolina's decision in Flood v. News & Courier Co., courts
were beginning to hold that simply the allegation of having
African blood was injurious depending upon community
standards.2 8
This statement, as written, is entirely at odds with both the thrust and decision
of the opinion.
205. See, e.g., Lidsky, supra note 111, at 32; Sharfstein, supra note 44, at
1500-01 n. 157. Plessy itself was, of course, a case about a passenger prosecuted
and convicted for insisting "on going into a coach or compartment to which by
race he [did] not belong." Plessy, 163 U.S. at 541; see, e.g., May v. Shreveport
Traction Co., 53 So. 671, 674 (La. 1910); Exparte Plessy, 45 La. Ann. 80 (1893).
The author of this article has created the term "tortious racial misidentification
in places of public accommodation" (RMPPA) to distinguish those cases from
cases alleging defamation per se by racial misidentification (DPSRM).
206. See, e.g., Wolfe v. Ga. Ry. & Elec. Co., 58 S.E. 899, 901 (Ga. Ct. App.
1907); S. Ry. Co. v. Thurman, 90 S.W. 240, 241 (Ky. 1906); May, 53 So. at 671
(holding a streetcar company liable when a conductor suggested that a
passenger belonged in the section of the car reserved for blacks); Lee v. New
Orleans Great N. R.R. Co., 51 So. 182, 184 (La. 1910) (affirming the dismissal of
a suit by two teenage girls, whose maternal grandfather was of mixed blood,
who were forced to ride in the Jim Crow car), discussed in Sharfstein, supra
note 44, at 1500-01 n.157.
207. See, e.g., BARBARA YOUNG WELKE, RECASTING AMERICAN LIBERTY:
GENDER, RACE, LAW, AND THE RAILROAD REVOLUTION, 1865-1920, 357-58
(2001); Sharfstein, supra note 44, at 1500-01 n.157 ("Some courts, however,
were unwilling to recognize such causes of action. In Southern Railway Co. v.
Thurman, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that '[w]hat race a person belongs
to cannot always be determined infallibly from appearances, and mistakes must
inevitably be made.... It is not a legal injury for a white person to be taken for
a negro. It was not contemplated by the statute that the carrier should be an
insurer as to the race of its passengers.'" (alteration in original) (citing
Thurman, 90 S.W. at 241));
208. An additional key distinction between the cases alleging racial
misidentification in public accommodations and early twentieth century cases
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After the South Carolina court's decision in Flood v.
News & Courier Co., the Louisiana court in May v. Shreveport
Traction Co. 209 suggested that the doctrines of RMPPA and
DPSRM were centrally linked and could lead to different
results. By the early 1900s, it was clear that Louisiana and
South Carolina were together developing the doctrine of
DPSRM; almost all of the important cases 210 advancing the
theory that calling a white man a "negro" or "colored" in
speech or print was actionable per se had emerged from just
two state supreme courts.2
Five years after Flood v. News & Courier Co., the
Louisiana Supreme Court took the lead back from South
Carolina in pushing the doctrine of DPSRM just a bit further.
Just as the South Carolina Supreme Court had cited the
Louisiana Supreme Court's decisions in Spotorno and Upton
in its decision in Flood v. News & Courier Co., the Louisiana
alleging defamation by racial misidentification was that most of the latter such
cases after 1900 involved libel, rather than a tort as transitory as slander.
Presumably, ushering a white man into a Jim Crow railway car, regardless of
how injurious, would have been more akin to slander than to libel.
209. May, 53 So. at 674-75.
210. "Important" as was determined by which cases were reported in state or
federal reporters.
211. The only case on this question decided by a state supreme court not to
arise in either South Carolina or Louisiana was McDowell v. Bowles, 53 N.C. (8
Jones) 184 (1860), in which the court held that referring to a white man as a
negro was not actionable per se because the language did not fit within one of
three traditional categories. The 1907 decision of the Georgia Court of Appeals
in Wolfe v. Georgia Railway & Electric Co., 58 S.E. 899 (Ga. Ct. App. 1907),
while a case of racial misidentification in public accommodation, might also be
considered a decision of similar importance. The Georgia Court of Appeals was
created in 1907, and its decisions were final and not reviewed by the Georgia
Supreme Court for the first ten years of the existence of the Court of Appeals.
Court of Appeals of Georgia, History of the Court of Appeals,
http'J/www.gaappeals.us/history (last visited Jan. 2, 2008). In Wolfe, the
Georgia court delivered a drawn-out screed on the inferiority of Blacks and
mixed-race individuals. Wolfe, 58 S.E. at 901 ("It is a matter of common
knowledge, that, viewed from a social standpoint, the negro race is in mind and
morals inferior to the Caucasian. The record. . . from the dawn of historic time
denies equality."). Citing Flood v. News & Courier Co., 50 S.E. 637 (S.C. 1905),
and Upton v. Times-Democrat Publishing Co., 28 So. 970 (La. 1900), the court
also concluded, "after the most mature consideration of every phase of the
question," that it was an insult "to seriously call a white man a negro, or to
intimate that a person apparently white is of African descent." Id.
Interestingly, even while citing Flood v. News & Courier Co. and Upton, Judge
Richard Brevard Russell (later Chief Justice of the Georgia Supreme Court)
steered away from any discussion of defamation, focusing instead only on
"injury." See id.
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Supreme Court now turned around and cited Flood v. News &
Courier Co. to support its ruling in May.212 In the decision,
Judge Monroe explicitly conflated the tortious RMPPA cases
and the tortious DPSRM cases.2 13 Emma May, an extremely
poor lady, had boarded the streetcar reserved for whites and
had paid her fare when she was asked by the conductor
whether she belonged "over there"-meaning the section of
the car reserved for colored passengers.214 May, who was
hard of hearing, waited until the conductor had taken two
more fares, and then asked him what he had said. 215  The
conductor repeated the question, now in a louder voice, so
that other people in the car could hear.216 May, deeply
offended, immediately left the train and brought a charge
against the conductor in city court, after which he was
arrested.217  After considering two cases holding transport
companies and their agents liable for misdirecting passengers
into the wrong racial cars,218 Judge Monroe decided to apply
the doctrine of effective DPSRM to hold the conductor in this
case liable for his actions.219 Monroe, however, then noted
that the court had not found that the conductor had
specifically referred to the plaintiff as a "negro," and held that
the question "don't you belong there," when the questioner
points to the seats reserved for African Americans, "is
sufficient to wound the feelings of the white person to whom
it is addressed."22 ° With this announcement, Monroe moved
the case back out of the realm of effective DPSRM and into
the realm of RMPPA. Monroe, oddly, then announced that
the court was of the opinion that the plaintiff "was not injured
212. May, 53 So. at 674-75.
213. Id. at 674 ("We now apply to the case another doctrine, which is also
well established, to wit, that, to charge a white person, in this part of the world,
with being a negro, is an insult, which must, of necessity, humiliate and may
materially injure, the person to whom the charge is applied.").
214. Id. at 672.
215. Id.
216. See id. at 672-73.
217. See id. at 673. The fact that the conductor was arrested suggests this
was a criminal case, though the final action was in tort and as the court
ultimately awarded damages.
218. See May v. Shreveport Traction Co., 53 So. 671, 674 (La. 1910) (citing
Wolfe v. Ga. Ry. & Elec. Co., 58 S.E. 899 (Ga. Ct. App. 1907); Exparte Plessy, 45
La. Ann. 80 (1893)).
219. See id.
220. Id. at 675.
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in the estimation of her friends and acquaintances or of the
public at large," but that she was still entitled to $250 for her
injury. 22' By awarding damages even though May was not
lowered in the eyes of anyone through the conductor's
statements, and so not requiring proof of injury in order to
allow recovery, the court confirmed that both DPSRM and
RMPPA cases in Louisiana would be decided on an effective
per se basis.222
With the decisions in Upton, Flood v. News & Courier
Co., and May, the Louisiana and South Carolina Supreme
Courts together resurrected and clarified the doctrine of
defamation per se by racial misidentification. Oddly, this
resurrection was in large part the result of the South
Carolina court's questionable action in applying Louisiana
precedent to develop a common law category. By 1910,
however, the doctrine was sufficiently well-developed for
other Southern courts to use and apply it in deciding common
law questions of defamation per se.
E. Assessing the "Community Standards" Model on a
Regional Scale
Despite twentieth-century views of the DPSRM doctrine
as monolithic, 2 3 after Spotorno, Upton, Flood v. News &
Courier Co., and May, courts reacted in a confusing variety of
ways to the Louisiana/South Carolina community standards
theory of DPSRM. Between 1910 and the early 1940s, Courts
in Virginia,224  Alabama,225  Arkansas,226  Oklahoma,227
Tennessee, 2 28 Texas,229 and Georgia 23° indicated that they in
221. Id.
222. See id.
223. See, e.g., Natchez Times Publ'g Co. v. Dunigan, 72 So. 2d 681, 684 (Miss.
1954) (citing 53 C.J.S. Libel and Slander § 10 (2005); 33 AM. JUR. 2D Libel and
Slander § 76 (2006); 50 A.L.R. 1413 (2008)).
224. See Mopsikov v. Cook, 95 S.E. 426 (Va. 1918); Spencer v. Looney, 82 S.E.
745 (Va. 1914).
225. See, e.g., Jones v. R.L. Polk & Co., 67 So. 577 (Ala. 1915).
226. See Morris v. State, 160 S.W. 387 (Ark. 1913).
227. See Hargrove v. Okla. Press Publ'g Co., 265 P. 635 (Okla. 1928); Collins
v. Okla. State Hosp., 184 P. 946 (Okla. 1916).
228. See Stultz v. Cousins, 242 F. 794 (6th Cir. 1917).
229. See O'Connor v. Dallas Cotton Exch., 153 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. Civ. App.
1941); Express Publ'g Co. v. Orsborn, 151 S.W. 574 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912).
230. In the only existent Georgia case (actually, two bundled cases) from this
period directly discussing the issue of DPSRM, the Georgia Court of Appeals
seemed to imply that it might be libelous to publish of a white person that he or
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some way accepted the doctrine of DPSRM.23' In Virginia,
Arkansas, and Oklahoma, however, the courts based their
decisions on local defamation statutes rather than on a
common law rule,232 and in Kentucky, New York, and Illinois,
courts simply rejected the doctrine of slander per se by racial
misidentification outright while adhering (sometimes in
dicta) to the doctrine of libel per se by racial
misidentification.233 In other words, while courts were citing
she was a negro but held that a newspaper publication referring to a white man
as a negro, but not referring to his parents, was not libel on his parents.
Atlanta Journal Co. v. Farmer, 172 S.E. 647 (Ga. Ct. App. 1934); see also
Bagwell v. Rice & Hutchins Atlanta Co., 143 S.E. 125 (Ga. Ct. App. 1928)
(holding that a claim by a white woman against a shoe salesman, who allegedly
said to her "You infernal negroes will put yourselves among white people, get
over with the negroes where you belong," was barred by a one-year statute of
limitations).
231. At least one other state court explicitly avoided the question. In Jones v.
Gill, the Supreme Court of Kansas reversed a decision holding the defendant
(the plaintiffs step-foster-grandmother) liable for alleging that the plaintiff,
who had been adopted by the defendant's adult step-son and his wife, was a
half-breed on the grounds that the trial judge had allowed improper evidence.
Jones v. Gill, 66 P.2d 1033 (Kan. 1937). "We are not called upon to determine
whether what defendant said at that time might form the basis of an action for
damages," the court noted, 'for this question is not before us, and we mention
this only because of argument on this point in appellee's brief." Id. at 1035. In
a 1919 Louisiana case, Berot v. Porte, the Supreme Court of Louisiana rejected
the plaintiffs claim that he had been slandered by being incorrectly described
as being of'negro" blood. Berot v. Porte, 81 So. 323 (La. 1919). In that case, the
plaintiff applied to become a member of the George Washington Grove of
Druids. Id. at 323. The court ruled that the defendant, who was a member of
the Investigation Committee looking into the plaintiffs background, had a duty
to report to his organization, and so--as he was speaking in good faith-could
not be liable for slander. Id. at 323-24. Given the Louisiana Supreme Court's
earlier opinions, it seems likely that Berot did not represent abandonment of the
community standards model of DPSRM. In the 1926 case of Deese v. Collins,
the North Carolina Supreme Court explicitly followed its earlier decision in
McDowell and held that saying that a man had 'negro blood in his veins" was
not actionable per se. Deese v. Collins, 133 S.E. 92 (N.C. 1926). In Deese,
however, the North Carolina court also distinguished words 'actionable in
themselves" from words not actionable in themselves, and suggested that,
provided that the plaintiff could prove damages, a false racial misidentification
could still be found defamatory. Id. ("In order to maintain an action for
damages resulting from such words, the plaintiff must allege and prove special
damages.").
232. See Morris v. State, 160 S.W. 387 (Ark. 1913); Hargrove, 265 P. at 635;
Collins, 184 P. at 946; Mopsikov v. Cook, 95 S.E. 426 (Va. 1918); Spencer v.
Looney, 82 S.E. 745 (Va. 1914).
233. See, e.g., Axton Fisher Tobacco Co. v. Evening Post Co., 183 S.W. 269
(Ky. 1916); Williams v. Riddle, 140 S.W. 661 (Ky. 1911); MacIntyre v. Fruchter,
148 N.Y.S. 786 (Sup. Ct. 1914); Wright v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 281 Ill. App. 495
(App. Ct. 1935).
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back to the critical South Carolina and Louisiana decisions
and often speaking in the language of the community
standards theory, during the first half of the twentieth
century the doctrine of DPSRM was actually far less cohesive
than it might at first appear.
During this period between 1910 and the early 1940s,
only four courts-two Texas courts,234 one Alabama court,235
and the Sixth Circuit, applying Tennessee law236-seemed to
accept the community standards theory of the DPSRM
doctrine wholeheartedly. Both the Sixth Circuit and one of
the Texas courts apparently simply followed the Louisiana
and South Carolina reasoning as described in the American
Law Reports.237 In the 1941 case of O'Connor v. Dallas
Cotton Exchange, for instance, the Dallas Court of Civil
Appeals noted that, "[a~lthough we have no Texas case
holding that, to falsely charge a white person with being a
negro would be slanderous," in view of "the social habits,
customs, traditions and prejudices prevalent in this state...
such a charge would be slanderous."238  Similarly, in
considering the case of a white railroad worker who had been
expelled from membership in the Brotherhood of Locomotive
Firemen and Enginemen after an investigation into
allegations that he was mulatto,239 the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals concluded simply that "the authorities establish that
the publication of a writing containing such a statement in
respect to a white man is libelous per se, at least in a
community in which marked social difference between the
races are established by law or custom." 240  In Stultz, the
234. See O'Connor, 153 S.W.2d at 266-69 (reversing on jurisdictional grounds
and remanding for trial a case in which a husband alleged that his wife had
been injured by being forced to ride an elevator reserved for Negros and so
racially misidentified); see also Express Publ'g Co., 151 S.W. at 574-75 (holding
that two news stories, published on different days, should be read together
where one wrongly referred to a criminal suspect as a "negress" but provided no
identifying information and the other contained no information on race, but
fully identified the suspect).
235. See, e.g., Jones v. R.L. Polk & Co., 67 So. 577 (Ala. 1915).
236. See Stultz v. Cousins, 242 F. 794, 796-98 (6th Cir. 1917).
237. 50 A.L.R. 1413 (2008).
238. O'Connor, 153 S.W.2d at 268.
239. Stultz, 242 F. at 796.
240. Id. at 797 (citing Axton Fisher Tobacco Co. v. Evening Post Co., 183
S.W. 269 (Ky. 1916); Flood v. News & Courier Co., 50 S.E. 637 (S.C. 1905);
Spencer v. Looney, 82 S.E. 745 (Va. 1914)).
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plaintiffs former Brotherhood published a letter identifying
the plaintiff as a mulatto.24' While the Sixth Circuit's
language makes it clear that the district court had been leery
of enforcing the general community standards rule too
strictly,242 it is ironic that it was a federal court applying
state law that was one of the only three courts in this period
strongly adhering to the "general"243 common law rule.
While the Texas Court of Appeals and the Sixth Circuit,
however reluctantly in the case of the latter, simply applied
the common law rule developed after Spotorno, Flood v. News
& Courier, Upton, and May, the Alabama Supreme Court in
the 1915 case of Jones v. R.L. Polk & Co. applied the common
law rule. Yet, the Alabama Supreme Court seemingly added
an element by holding that whether a publication was
libelous per se in any particular case depends upon the
circumstances, including whether there was malice on the
part of the speaker.244 In Jones, Mary A. Jones sued R.L.
Polk & Company alleging that Polk maliciously slandered her
by publishing an asterisk (indicating that she was colored)
next to her name in the Selma City Directory. 245 "The general
statement that a person is 'colored' imputes no crime, . .."
wrote Judge Anthony Dickinson Sayre (the father,
incidentally, of Zelda Fitzgerald, F. Scott Fitzgerald's wife),
"and yet in the peculiar social conditions prevailing in this
jurisdiction, to publish of and concerning a white woman that
she is colored .. . is libelous within the definition of libel
241. Stultz, 242 F. at 796-97.
242. Id. at 797 (suggesting the non-viability of the doctrine of slander per se
by racial misidentification by referring to "whatever be the rule as to spoken
words"). The Sixth Circuit also noted that the trial judge acted correctly in
refusing to instruct the jury that the charge was libelous per se:
While the trial judge might have taken judicial notice of the racial
situation in eastern Tennessee, and based thereon might have
instructed the jury that the charge was libelous per se, he gave the
defendants an opportunity to persuade the jury that the statement
made in that particular section of Tennessee might not be libelous per
se ....
Id. at 798.
243. See, e.g., Natchez Times Publ'g Co. v. Dunigan, 72 So. 2d 681 (Miss.
1954).
244. Jones v. R.L. Polk & Co., 67 So. 577, 577 (Ala. 1915). The question of
malice had arisen before, as in Upton v. Times-Democrat Publishing Co., 28 So.
970 (La. 1900), and there had limited Upton's recovery to actual damages. The
"general rule," however, dealt with the per se question and the malice issue.
245. Jones, 67 So. at 577.
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commonly found in the books."246  Judge Sayre did not
explicitly discuss the nature of per se liability, but in citing
Flood v. News & Courier Co. and speaking in the language of
community standards, he suggested that under the social
conditions in Alabama, such language would constitute
defamation per se.247  Then, however, Sayre noted that
"whether, then, such a publication is libelous in any
particular case depends upon circumstances. Here then is
room for innocent mistakes."248 Sayre sought to distinguish
Flood v. News & Courier Co. on the grounds that in Flood the
court had concluded that the publication was willful and
malicious, whereas in Jones the publisher had simply made a
mistake in misidentifying one individual in the long list of
"Joneses".249  The effect of this decision, however, was
seemingly to alter the common law doctrine of DPSRM in
Alabama by requiring that plaintiffs prove additional
elements-here, that the defendants acted maliciously and
not accidently by publishing the offending material.
While in a number of cases in the 1910s and 1920s, the
Virginia, Arkansas, and Oklahoma Supreme Courts, citing
back to Spotorno, 25 0 held that to call a white person a negro
was per se actionable, either as slander or libel. These three
courts in fact decided these cases upon "very broad and
comprehensive"251 defamation statutes rather than upon the
common law doctrine of DPSRM. 5 2 In the 1913 Arkansas
case of Morris v. State, for example, the state prosecutors
used a broad criminal statute to prosecute Bill Morris for
alleging that "Mrs. [James] Holt's father was a thief, . . . her
mother a negro, and she a half-breed."25 3 Under Arkansas's
statute, "it [was] deemed slander to falsely use, utter, or
publish words which, in their common acceptation, shall





250. See, e.g., Morris v. State, 160 S.W. 387, 388 (Ark. 1913) (citing Spotorno
v. Fourichon, 4 So. 71 (La. 1888); Flood v. News & Courier Co., 50 S.E. at 637);
Spencer v. Looney, 82 S.E. 745, 747 (Va. 1914)).
251. Id. This citation refers only to the Arkansas statute, but the statutes in
Virginia, Mississippi, West Virginia, and Oklahoma were similarly broader than
the general common law rule of defamation.
252. MANGUM, supra note 42, at 19-20.
253. Morris, 160 S.W. at 387.
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amount to . . . bring into disrepute the good name or
character of such person so slandered. 2 54 Citing both Flood
v. News & Courier Co. and Spotorno, Judge Hart concluded
that "under our social conditions, . . . it cannot be disputed
that charging a white man with being a negro is calculated to
bring into disrepute his good name or character."255  The
Arkansas Supreme Court, however, actually cited Spotorno
for the Louisiana Supreme Court's sociological reasoning
rather than its legal reasoning (and the legal reasoning of the
following cases of Flood v. News & Courier Co., Upton, and
May).2 56 Ultimately, the Arkansas Supreme Court based its
decision not on the general rules of defamation discussed in
these cases, but rather on the Arkansas criminal slander
statute.257
Like the Arkansas Supreme Court in Morris, the Virginia
Supreme Court in both Spencer v. Looney and Mopsikov v.
Cook spoke in the language of the community standards
model of the DSPRM doctrine, but in fact decided both cases
under a specific local defamation statute.258 In both cases,
moreover, the Virginia Supreme Court demanded that the
jury find that the words had been uttered with malice-thus,
as in Alabama,259 adding another layer to DPSRM liability.26°
In the first of these cases, George Spencer sued George
Looney for libel, alleging that Looney had "in the presence
and hearing of . . .divers other good and worthy citizens"
announced that Spencer, his wife, and their children "are




258. See also Cook v. Patterson Drug Co., 39 S.E.2d 304, 305-06 (Va. 1946).
In Cook, the defendant, a seventeen-year-old soda jerk, identified the plaintiff
as a "negro" and insisted that the plaintiffs hair looked like the hair of a black
man. Id. at 306. As was the custom of the store, the defendant accordingly
refused to serve the plaintiff a Coca-Cola in a glass, and instead served the
plaintiff Pepsi-Cola in a paper cup. Id. The court, holding that juries
deliberating in cases involving Virginia's slander statute should not consider
the intent of the defendants, reversed the judgment for the defendant and
remanded for retrial. Id. at 308. By eliminating consideration of the
defendant's intent (here, lack of intent to insult), Cook thus reinforced the per se
nature under the Virginia anti-dueling slander statute of liability for any racial
misidentification.
259. See Jones v. R.L. Polk & Co., 67 So. 577 (Ala. 1915).
260. See, e.g., Mopsikov v. Cook, 95 S.E. 426, 428 (Va. 1918); Spencer v.
Looney, 82 S.E. 745, 748-49 (Va. 1914).
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nothing but God damned negroes, and I can prove that they
are God damned negroes."26' Looney, angry because
Spencer's brother had killed his (Looney's) brother, repeated
the claim numerous times and eventually succeeded in
having Spencer's son ejected from the free white public
schools.262 Looney's attorney conceded that "to speak of one
or more persons as negroes, if untrue and they be white
persons as a matter of fact, is scandalous and defamatory,"
but argued that the adoption of the Reconstruction
Amendments had made such words not actionable.263 Writing
for the court, Judge Richard Henry Cardwell concluded:
"Upon the soundest reasoning, founded on common
knowledge and authority, this contention is wholly without
merit."264 Citing Strauder and Flood v. News & Courier Co.,
Cardwell explicitly invoked Judge Fenner's community
standards model in Spotorno.265 "What was said in that case
with respect to social habits, customs, etc., prevailing in
Louisiana," Judge Cardwell concluded, "applies with equal
force to any state or locality in which the white and negro
races are established as citizens."266 In Mopsikov, the court
reiterated the arguments it had made in Spencer by citing
Spencer in place of cases such as Spotorno and Flood v. News
& Courier Co. 2 67 In the case, Benjamin E. Cook sued Jacob
Mopsikov, alleging that Mopsikov's young daughter routinely
referred to Cook's young daughter as "a nigger doll."268
Despite concluding that the words alleged in the declaration
"were actionable per se under the statute in Virginia on the
subject," and possibly even "actionable per se at common law
also" because they affected the plaintiffs business,269 Judge
Sims reversed and remanded on the basis of a number of
errors made by the trial judge.27 °
261. Spencer, 82 S.E. at 746.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 746-47 (noting that this was the same argument the Louisiana
Supreme Court had rejected in Spotorno v. Fourichon, 4 So. 71 (La. 1888)).
264. Id. at 747.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. See Mopsikov v. Cook, 95 S.E. 426, 428 (Va. 1918).
268. Id. at 427.
269. This legal theory would have fit into one of the established categories of
defamation per se, and does not indicate that the court was considering the
broader DSPRM doctrine.
270. See Mopsikov, 95 S.E. at 428.
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Like both the Arkansas and Virginia Supreme Courts,
the Oklahoma Supreme Court was deciding cases on the basis
of a local defamation statute while citing to broader cases
establishing the common law doctrine of DPSRM and
speaking in the language of the community standards theory.
In the 1916 case of Collins v. Oklahoma State Hospital,271 for
instance, the Oklahoma Supreme Court, while finding
against a plaintiff whose daughter, a resident in a hospital for
the insane, had been mistakenly assigned to a colored ward
(and had her charts flagged with the word "colored"),
nonetheless concluded that writing of or about a white person
that he is a negro constitutes defamation.272 "In this state,"
Judge Hooker wrote, with its "reasonable regulation of the
conduct of the races, . . . and where the habits, the
disposition, and characteristics of the race denominate the
colored race as inferior to the Caucasian, it is libelous per se
to write of or concerning a white person that he is colored."273
Despite this language, and despite citing to numerous cases
establishing and utilizing the community standards model,274
Hooker noted that in order to determine the question, "we
must refer to section 4956 of the Revised Laws of 1910," the
general libel statute.2 75  Similarly, in its 1928 decision in
Hargrove v. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co., the Oklahoma
Supreme Court apparently ruled on the basis of this same
statute while citing to its earlier decision in Collins in
sweeping terms.276  In Hargrove, the wife of William
Hargrove, a convicted bootlegger, sued the Oklahoma
publisher of the Muskogee Phoenix for printing a story
claiming that her husband was a Negro.277  "Does the
published article contain libel actionable per se?" asked Judge
271. Collins v. Okla. State Hosp., 184 P. 946 (Okla. 1916) (noting that the
case was later reheard and confirmed in 1919).
272. Id. at 947.
273. Id.
274. Id. (citing Jones v. R.L. Polk & Co., 67 So. 577 (Ala. 1915); Upton v.
Times-Democrat Publ'g Co., 28 So. 970 (La. 1900); Spotorno v. Fourichon, 4 So.
71 (La. 1888); Flood v. News & Courier Co., 50 S.E. 637 (S.C. 1905); Spencer v.
Looney, 82 S.E. 745 (Va. 1914)).
275. Id. ("[Aind by that we see that any false or malicious unprivileged
publication by writing, printing, etc., which exposes any person to public hatred,
contempt, etc., is libelous.").
276. See Hargrove v. Okla. Press Publ'g Co., 265 P. 635, 636 (Okla. 1928).
277. Id. at 635-36.
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Mason, writing for the court. 2  "There are, perhaps, some
parts of the United States in which a publication describing a
white man as a negro would not tend to disgrace or degrade
or render him odious in the estimation of his friends and
acquaintances," concluded Mason, but all such debate in
Oklahoma "has been definitely settled" by Collins.279 Despite
Mason's invocation of Collins, it seems clear that the ultimate
decision in Hargrove depended upon the defamation statute-
and the fact that it was Hargrove's wife, rather than
Hargrove himself, who was suing.28 °
Perhaps because of the confusion inherent in mixing the
statutorily-based decisions in Virginia, Arkansas, and
Oklahoma with the common law community standards rule
created in South Carolina, it was the courts in other states,
including Kentucky, New York, and Illinois, that signaled an
important shift in the doctrine of DPSRM between 1911 and
1935 by distinguishing between and rejecting the doctrine of
slander per se while retaining the doctrine of libel per se.281
In 1911, for instance, in the important case of Williams v.
Riddle, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky held that it was not
slander per se to say of a white man that he was a "damn
negro, and his mother was a mulatto."28 2 "There is a marked
distinction, probably the result of some historical accident,
between slander and libel," wrote Judge Shackelford
278. Id. at 636. Mason went on to define the term "per se," noting:
[Ihn connection with slander and libel, the term is applied to words
which are actionable because they, of themselves, without anything
more, are opprobrious. In other words, a publication is actionable per
se when the language used therein is susceptible of but one meaning,
and that an opprobrious one, and the publication on its face shows that
the derogatory statements, taken as a whole, refer to the plaintiff, and
not to some other person.
Id. (citing Rowan v. Gazette Printing Co., 239 P. 1035 (Mont. 1925)).
279. Id. (citing Collins v. Okla. State Hosp., 184 P. 946, 948 (Okla. 1916)).
280. Id. at 637 (affirming the trial court's judgment by concluding that "[wie
believe it would be stretching the rule of libel too far to say that a false
imputation that a man is a negro is a libel upon his wife").
281. See, e.g., Wright v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 281 Ill. App. 495 (App. Ct. 1935)
(holding that a woman customer was not entitled to recover from store owner
for slander, in that store employees stated that she was a "nigger" and therefore
could not be served, in absence of showing of a special damages or a detailed
showing of nature of woman's business rendering such word injurious to her
business); Axton Fisher Tobacco Co. v. Evening Post, 183 S.W. 269 (Ky. 1916);
Williams v. Riddle, 140 S.W. 661 (Ky. 1911); MacIntyre v. Fruchter, 148 N.Y.S.
786 (Sup. Ct. 1914).
282. Williams, 140 S.W. at 664.
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Miller.28 3  It is only when "oral charges of dishonesty,
rascality, or general depravity are uttered or spoken of a
person in his business or employment, or impute to him the
commission of a crime, that they are actionable per se," Miller
explained.284 Miller then embarked on a long analysis of
numerous cases concerning the per se defamation rule of
racial misidentification .285 Given the logic in these cases, and
especially in McDowell, regarding slander, Miller concluded,
the words used in Riddle were simply not actionable per se.286
Five years later, in Axton Fisher Tobacco Co. v. Evening Post
Co., Judge Carroll echoed Miller by noting that "[i]t will thus
be seen that many words are actionable when written or
printed and published which would not be actionable if
merely spoken." 287
Like the Kentucky Supreme Court in Riddle and Axton
Fisher, one New York court and one Illinois court deciding
cases involving the doctrine of DPSRM strongly distinguished
between slander per se and libel per se-and so avoided
enforcing the doctrine while ostensibly adhering to it. 288  In
the first of these cases, the 1914 New York case of MacIntyre
v. Fruchter, the defendant allegedly stated to the plaintiff:
"You are a dirty bitch; you are a dirty lousy blackguard and a
swindler. You are only fit for niggers to associate with and
only worked for niggers in the South."2 89 Concluding that
283. Id. at 661 (describing the five classes of words slanderous per se, as
recognized in Pollard v. Lyon, 91 U.S. 225 (1875)).
284. Id. at 662 (citing Brooker v. Coffin, 5 Johns. 188 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1809)).
285. Id. at 663-64 (citing Johnson v. Brown, 13 F. Cas. 734 (C.C.D.C. 1832)
(No. 7375); Upton v. Times-Democrat Publ'g Co., 28 So. 970 (La. 1900); Spotorno
v. Fourichon, 4 So. 71 (La. 1888); McDowell v. Bowles, 53 N.C. (8 Jones) 154
(1860); Barrett v. Jarvis, 1 Tapp. 244 (5th Cir. Ohio 1818); Eden v. Legare, 1
S.C.L. (1 Bay) 171 (Ct. Com. P1. & Gen. Sess. 1791); King v. Wood, 10 S.C.L. (1
Nott & McC.) 184 (Const. Ct. App. 1818); Atkinson v. Hartley, 12 S.C.L. (1
McCord) 203, 204 (Const. Ct. App. 1821); Flood v. News & Courier Co., 50 S.E.
637 (S.C. 1905)). It is this comprehensive analysis that made Riddle such an
important case.
286. Id. at 664.
287. Axton Fisher Tobacco Co. v. Evening Post Co., 183 S.W. 269, 274 (Ky.
1916). In Axton, the tobacco company sued a newspaper that published an
article alleging incorrectly that the company placed negro foremen over white
girls. Id. at 270-74. While the words would not have been slanderous per se
had they been spoken, concluded the court, the fact that they were written and
published made them libelous per se. Id. at 274-76.
288. See Wright v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 281 Ill. App. 495 (App. Ct. 1935);
MacIntyre v. Fruchter, 148 N.Y.S. 786 (Sup. Ct. 1914).
289. MacIntyre, 148 N.Y.S. at 786. MacIntyre is distinguishable from other
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only words that "charge[d] or import[ed] the commission of a
crime by the plaintiff [or] . . . impute unchastity to her"
constitute slander per se,29° Judge Tompkins of the Supreme
Court of Orange County held that the words in this case were
simply not defamatory. 291 Had the words been written or
printed, however, he baldly stated, with no legal analysis, the
words would have been libelous per se. 292
In the second of these cases, over twenty years later, the
Appellate Court for the Fourth District of Illinois similarly
held that words that would have constituted libel per se were
not slanderous in themselves.293 In Wright v. F.W. Woolworth
Co., Edna Wright claimed that when she entered the F.W.
Woolworth's in Mt. Vernon to purchase a root beer, one of the
store's employees announced that "[w]e can't serve you
because you are a nigger."294  "In considering whether a
defamatory charge is actionable or not," noted the court, "the
distinction between oral and written words must be kept in
mind, as the same rules of law do not apply to libel, as to
slander, the law of the former being wider than that of the
latter."295 As the words in this case did not fall into any of the
five common law classes of spoken words constituting slander
per se, Presiding Judge Edwards, citing McDowell, noted, the
language was not defamatory.296 Wright nonetheless insisted
that the common law of slander per se by racial
misidentification had been expanded by the South Carolina
cases. After considering numerous precedents, including
Eden, Riddle, Scott, Dobard, Spencer, and Spotorno, the court
observed cogently that the cases had been misinterpreted.297
"The authorities which hold such spoken words are not, per
se, slanderous, are found, upon examination to rest upon the
principles of the common law . . . ," Edwards concluded.298
"[T]hose which rule otherwise are based upon local conditions
cases in that it was not dealing with a direct allegation that white woman was
in fact black, but rather dealt with a claim that the court thought might have
imputed unchastity. See id. at 787.
290. Id. at 786.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. See Wright, 281 Ill. App. 495.
294. Id. at 497.
295. Id. (citing Williams v. Riddle, 140 S.W. 661 (Ky. 1911)).
296. Id. at 599.
297. Id. at 501-03.
298. Id. at 503.
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or local statutes, or rendered at a time when the colored race
was without civil rights."299
While the court's holding in Wright was limited to
concluding that the words were not slanderous per se, and
while the court explicitly noted that the words would have
constituted libel per se, this sort of reasoning could have
established a foundation for challenging the entire
community standards model of defamation per se by racial
misidentification. °0 Within twenty years, an Appellate Court
of Illinois in Mitchell v. Tribune Co. rejected a plaintiffs claim
that he had been identified in a newspaper as "Isaiah 'Chink'
Mitchell, 'Negro. '"' 3 1 Mitchell's race is unclear from the
opinion, which is most notable for its brevity. The fact that
the court cited Wright, however, suggests that the court had
in mind at least the question of racial misidentification. The
complaint, the court concluded, "fail[s] to state a cause of
action in libel. The reference to plaintiff was not libelous per
se . . "302 The complaint otherwise, the court added, "is
insufficient to make the alleged articles libelous where no
special damages are properly alleged."30 3 Put another way,
Mitchell seems to stand for the principle, in Illinois, that even
published written material wrongly (and here, seemingly
maliciously) labeling an individual a "Negro" did not
constitute libel per se.3°4
F. Full Circle: The Last Gasps of Defamation Per Se by
Racial Misidentification
This Section examines what now appear to be the two
great "last gasps" of the judicially-supported doctrine of
defamation-actually only libel-per se by racial
misidentification: the 1954 Mississippi decision in Natchez
299. Wright v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 281 Ill. App. 495, 503 (App. Ct. 1935)
300. See id. at 497-500.
301. Mitchell v. Tribune Co., 99 N.E.2d 397 (Ill. App. Ct. 1951)
302. Id. at 397 (citing Wright, 281 Ill. App. 495, "and cases there cited").
303. Id.
304. While this article is focused on DPSRM cases involving whites and
blacks, Mitchell demonstrates how the DPSRM doctrine at times implicated
other racial identifications. In some states, plaintiffs brought (or attempted to
bring) DPSRM cases arguing that they had been mistakenly identified as
"Mexican." See, e.g., Davis v. Meyer, 212 N.W. 435 (Neb. 1927) (holding that an
allegation that the plaintiff was a "half-breed Mexican" did not constitute
slander per se, in part as peoples of many different backgrounds were Mexicans,
and " [tihe Mexicans are not of the black or yellow race").
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Times Publishing Co. v. Dunigan and the 1957 South
Carolina decision in Bowen v. Independent Publishing Co.305
These cases suggest that the doctrine of libel per se by racial
misidentification was still quite powerful in the 1950s, at
least in Mississippi and South Carolina, even though courts
had been moving away from recognizing slander per se by
racial defamation. This Section also argues, however, that
while there is little in the outcomes of these two cases to
suggest that the Mississippi and South Carolina Supreme
Courts were considering completely abandoning the doctrine
of defamation per se by racial misidentification, there is some
evidence to suggest that in Mississippi even the Supreme
Court was interested in limiting the full scope of the per se
rule, especially as applied to slander, and that in South
Carolina, the traditional structure of the per se doctrine was
under attack from at least one influential lower-court judge.
In 1954, for the first time, the Mississippi Supreme Court
in Natchez Times explicitly determined that asserting in print
that a white woman was a Negro was libelous per se. °6 Mary
Dunigan sued The Natchez Times, which on December 19,
1951, reporting on an automobile accident involving Dunigan,
had described her (in the words of the court) as "a Negro
woman travelling in the company of two Negro men."30 7
Dunigan (whose name was misspelled as "Dungan" by the
newspaper) and both of the men were in fact white.308 After
Dunigan recovered a judgment for $5000, the newspaper
appealed. °9 "It does not appear that this Court has ever
decided whether it is libelous per se to write of a white
woman that she is a Negro," noted Presiding Justice William
G. Roberds 1° In holding that such writing did constitute
libel per se, Roberds did not attempt to create new doctrine,
but instead appealed explicitly to "the general rule" as
305. See, e.g., Natchez Times Publ'g Co. v. Dunigan, 72 So. 2d 681 (Miss.
1954); Bowen v. Indep. Publ'g Co., 96 S.E.2d 564 (S.C. 1957).
306. See Natchez Times Publ'g Co., 72 So. 2d at 684.
307. Id. at 683.
308. The Natchez Times reporter who took the information for the article
from a police report had somehow injected numerous racial descriptions into his
writing, though there was no mention in the police report of the races of any of
the detainees. Id. According to the Natchez Times Publishing Co. court, for
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established in various legal treatises 311 and in cases such as
Flood v. News & Courier Co., Spotorno, and Upton.312 In
Mississippi, Roberds noted, the general definition of libel per
se was "any written or printed language which tends to injure
one's reputation, and thereby expose him to public hatred,
contempt or ridicule, degrade him in society, lessen him in
public esteem or lower him in the confidence of the
community."313 Publishing that a white woman is a Negro,
Roberds concluded, met this requirement, and so constituted
libel per se.314
Even while holding that writing that a white woman was
a Negro was libelous per se, the Mississippi Supreme Court
simultaneously explicitly rejected the argument that saying
that a white woman was a Negro constituted slander per
se.3 5 Roberds distinguished the 1844 case of Scott, in which
the court had held that orally alleging that a white individual
had Negro blood constituted slander under Mississippi's
Actionable Words Statute. 316 "It is noted, in this connection,"
Roberds added, "that generally to orally call a white person a
Negro is not actionable per se, but it may be actionable in
certain sections of the country under the social habits and
customs prevailing in those sections." 317  This comment in
dicta suggests both that Roberds had no intention of opposing
the community standards model of DPSRM and that Roberds
was attempting to distinguish between the doctrine of slander
per se and the various judicial decisions from Southern states
holding such language to be slander not needing proof of
special damages because of the community standards.3 1 8 Put
another way, Roberds might have been attempting to draw a
line between the common law doctrine of defamation per se
and the manner in which some Southern states had been
conflating that doctrine with the community standards model
of defamation.
311. Id. at 684 (citing 53 C.J.S. Libel and Slander § 27 (2005); 33 AM. JUR. 2D
Libel and Slander § 76 (2006); 50 A.L.R. 1413 (1986)).
312. See Natchez Times Publ'g Co. v. Dunigan, 72 So. 2d 681, 684 (Miss.
1954).
313. Id. (citing Conroy v. Breland, 189 So. 814, 815 (Miss. 1939)).
314. See id.
315. See id.
316. See id. (citing MISS. CODE ANN. § 1059 (1942)).
317. Id. at 683-84.
318. See, e.g., supra Part II.A.
388 [Vol:50
"NEGRO BLOOD IN HIS VEINS"
Three years later, with its relatively short decision in the
1957 case of Bowen v. Independent Publishing Co., the South
Carolina Supreme Court similarly affirmed its adherence to
the doctrine of DPSRM--or at least the doctrine of libel per se
by racial misidentification-and reversed a lower court that
had narrowly read the court's 1904 decision in Flood v. News
& Courier Co. as seriously restricting the doctrine and
overturning the precedential legacy of Eden v. Legare.319 In
Bowen, as in Natchez Times, the only question before the
court was whether it was libelous per se to identify a white
person as a Negro in print.32° In South Carolina, however,
unlike in Mississippi, this question had arguably already
been decided by the state Supreme Court in 1904 in Flood v.
News & Courier Co. 321 Fifty years later, on March 11, 1954,
the Anderson Daily Mail published, under a picture of a
colored soldier and the heading "Negro News," the note that
Maudie Bowen's son had been transferred to a government
hospital. 322  At trial, the presiding judge, James M.
Brailsford, Jr., after analyzing Flood v. News & Courier Co.,
directed a verdict in favor of the newspaper, and Bowen
appealed. 23  In deciding this question, Acting Associate
Justice E.H. Henderson traced the full history of South
Carolina decisions on defamation by racial misidentification,
beginning with Eden v. Legare, and running through King,
Atkinson, and finally concluding with Flood v. News &
Courier Co. 324  Like Justice Roberds in Mississippi,
Henderson, in Bowen, affirmed that such publication
constituted libel per se and ruled that the case needed to be
returned to the jury, thus explicitly invoking the community
standards model of defamation.325
In its decision in Bowen, the South Carolina Supreme
Court was moving directly to counter a decision by Judge
319. See Bowen v. Indep. Publ'g Co., 96 S.E.2d 564 (S.C. 1957).
320. See id. at 564.
321. See, e.g., Flood v. News & Courier Co., 50 S.E. 637 (S.C. 1905)
322. See Bowen, 96 S.E.2d at 564.
323. See id.
324. See id. at 564-65.
325. "The earlier cases were decided at a time when slavery existed, and
since then great changes have taken place in the legal and political status of the
colored race," Henderson observed. Id. at 565. "However, there is still to be
considered the social distinction existing between the races, since libel may be
based upon social status." Id.
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Brailsford (later a long-time member of the South Carolina
Supreme Court), who had apparently interpreted Flood v.
News & Courier Co. as redefining, and perhaps effectively
eliminating, the per se nature of libel by racial
misidentification.32 6 Brailsford had focused on the fact that
in Flood v. News & Courier Co., while Chief Justice Pope
wrote the opinion finding that a newspaper had committed
libel per se when it described a white man as "colored," the
other three members of the court had simply concurred "in
the result, as the complaint alleges that the publication was
willful and malicious."327 Brailsford read Flood v. News &
Courier Co. as holding that it was not actionable per se to
publish of a white person that he or she was a Negro, unless
such publication was done willfully and maliciously.3 21 "We
do not think that interpretation is the correct one,"
Henderson concluded. 329 Rather than as evidence that the
court had overturned Eden v. Legare, King, and Atkinson, he
explained, Flood should be read to show that the other three
members of the court had decided that in Flood that they did
not need to address the question of whether willfulness and
maliciousness were necessary elements of any per se libel
case, as the defendant in the case had acted maliciously.33 °
"[We] think that the long established rule [that saying of a
white man that he is a Negro is defamatory per sel is not
changed . . . and is still the law of this State," Henderson
declared.331
While there is little in Natchez Times or Bowen to
suggest that the Mississippi and South Carolina Supreme
Courts were interested in striking a blow against racism by
eliminating the tort of LPSRM, there is clearly some evidence
in these cases that the doctrine of DPSRM was being limited
at the margins and perhaps even directly challenged by lower
court judges. In Natchez Times, for instance, the Mississippi
Supreme Court, in dicta (and with no citations), noted that in
Mississippi "to orally call a white person a Negro" was not
actionable per se, even though Mississippi clearly subscribed
326. See id.
327. Id. (citing Flood v. News & Courier Co., 50 S.E. at 641).
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to the community standards model of defamation and Judge
Roberds acknowledged that "it may be actionable in certain
sections of the country under the social habits and customs
prevailing in those sections."332 Roberds, in other words, was
staking out a clear position on the absence of the doctrine of
slander per se by racial misidentification, even as he was
explicitly supporting "the general rule"333 regarding the
existence of the doctrine of libel per se by racial
misidentification. In Bowen, the South Carolina Supreme
Court was reacting specifically to Judge Brailsford's decision,
fifty years after the fact, to read Flood v. News & Courier Co.
as overturning South Carolina precedent and starkly limiting
the doctrine of DSPRM, despite the fact that in Flood, Chief
Judge Pope had spoken about the doctrine in an expansive
way, and that the three concurrences in the case made no
mention of disagreeing with Pope's legal reasoning.334 Such a
challenge to a well-understood and general doctrine in a
profoundly racist state such as South Carolina in the 1950s,
however carefully cloaked in narrow reading of precedent, is
shocking and may indicate that at least some Southern
judges were reacting to Cold War pressures (and the
international embarrassment of American racism), the
worldwide response to Hitler's racial theories, or even the
changing American judicial tone signaled in the 1950s by
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka.
PART III: THE SHRINKING UNIVERSE: EXPLAINING THE
DISAPPEARANCE OF THE DOCTRINE OF DEFAMATION PER SE BY
RACIAL MISIDENTIFICATION
Part III of this article addresses the historical mystery
represented by the disappearance of the doctrine of
defamation per se by racial misidentification after the late
1950s, and argues that this disappearance can, in large part,
be explained by the intersection of three legal and societal
trends or developments that had the effect of shrinking the
available and traditional universe of potential DPSRM cases
to almost nothing.335 Obviously, there are many reasons why
332. Natchez Times Publ'g Co. v. Dunigan, 72 So. 2d 681, 683-84 (Miss.
1954).
333. See supra note 311.
334. See Flood v. News & Courier Co., 50 S.E. 637 (S.C. 1905).
335. While the final identifiable reported DPSRM case was decided by the
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prospective plaintiffs choose not to bring cases, or why cases,
once brought, are either settled or fail to appear in the court
reporters. These three trends-the judicial move away from
the slander per se element of the doctrine; the societal and
statutory move away from official, state-sponsored racism;
and the Supreme Court move toward using First Amendment
doctrine to limit tort liability in libel cases involving public
figures or matters of public concern-chipped away at the
traditional universe of prospective DPSRM cases, such that
by the 1970s almost all of the cases that had served as the
bread and butter of the DPSRM doctrine between the late
1700s and mid-1950s could any longer have represented a
viable claim. 36 Of all the identifiable reported DPSRM cases,
approximately one-third to one-half involved allegations of
slander per se under non-statutory slander regimes,337 almost
South Carolina Supreme Court in 1957, see Bowen, 96 S.E.2d 564, in examining
the disappearance of DPSRM cases, it is probably incorrect to focus on 1957 as
the critical year. Given the relative scarcity of DPSRM cases-there were, for
example, only three decided in the 1950s, and there were at least two periods
after the Civil War when reported cases were separated by seven years-and
the possibility that there were numerous DPSRM cases being decided at lower
or unpublished levels through the late 1950s, it seems more useful to examine
the changes that arose in the decade after the decision in Bowen. In other
words, it would be unusual to expect there to be another important (and thus
reported) DPSRM decision in the 1950s or perhaps even in the 1960s. There
were clearly important legal developments in 1957, especially implicating
speech and the First Amendment. On June 17, 1957, for example, a day anti-
Communists called "Red Monday," the Supreme Court, in four decisions,
essentially gutted the Smith Act and protected the rights of individuals to
discuss and even espouse communism. See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 354
U.S. 298 (1957); ARTHUR J. SABIN, IN CALMER TIMES: THE SUPREME COURT AND
RED MONDAY (1999). Nonetheless, the key question in examining the
disappearance of DPSRM decisions is why such decisions vanished from the
court reporters during the whole period from the late 1950s through, perhaps,
the early 1970s.
336. Almost all DPSRM cases decided between 1791 and 1957 are swept in
by these three developments. There are seven exceptions-the cases decided
under the highly protective defamation statutes of Virginia, Mississippi, and
Oklahoma, see infra note 365, and Stultz v. Cousins, 242 F. 794 (6th Cir. 1917).
In Stultz, a railroad worker sued after he was ejected from the Brotherhood of
Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen and the Brotherhood issued a letter
claiming that Stultz was "mulatto." 242 F. at 796. While affirming the ruling,
the Sixth Circuit held that the judge had not erred by refusing to instruct the
jury that the publication of the letter necessarily constituted defamation per se.
Id. at 798. The defendant was ultimately held liable under a non-statutory,
defamation per se system for a libelous publication distributed by a private
organization. Id. at 797-98.
337. See infra note 356-57.
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one-third involved allegations of defamation brought under
statutory or societal regimes that had largely vanished by the
mid-twentieth century, 338 and one-third involved allegations
of libel per se brought against media outlets for accidental
racial misidentification. 319  With the development of these
three trends, the only remaining viable DPSRM claims would
have come in cases in which, for example, a media outlet
misrepresented in a knowing or reckless manner the race of
those on whom it reported, or in which a private individual
racially misidentified another in some sort of permanent
medium such as print. Given the increasing reluctance of
judges after the 1960s to embrace racist doctrines, along with
the fact that reported DPSRM cases were always fairly rare,
it thus comes as no surprise that plaintiffs stopped pursuing
such claims in the courts-or that, if plaintiffs did pursue
such claims, that the claims were ultimately laughed out of
the courtroom. 4 ° Section A examines the judicial move away
from the slander per se element of the DPSRM doctrine.
Section B discusses the effects of changing societal attitudes
towards race, disappearing idiosyncratic statutes such as
South Carolina's Slave Act of 1740, and passing of legislation
such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights
Act of 1965. Section C focuses on the Supreme Court's move
in the 1960s and 1970s to apply the First Amendment to limit
tort liability in libel cases, which move helped shield media
outlets reporting on public figures or matters of public
concern.
A. Judicial Limitations on the Doctrine of Slander Per Se
This Section examines the effect of the judicial move
during the twentieth century, even in states that continued to
recognize and apply the DPSRM doctrine, away from the
slander per se element of the doctrine (often in favor of the
libel per se element of the doctrine), and the concurrent trend
338. See infra notes 364-65, 368.
339. See infra note 376.
340. See, e.g., Thomason v. Times-Journal, Inc., 379 S.E.2d 551, 553 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1989); Johnson v. Staten Island Advance Newspaper Inc., No. 38480/03,
2004 WL 4986754 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. July 23, 2004); supra notes 1-9 and
accompanying text. It also seems clear that at some point in the second half of
the twentieth century, judges faced with deciding DPSRM claims would have
begun using evolving Equal Protection doctrine to dismiss DPSRM cases out of
hand.
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in some states towards incorporating a malice component into
the doctrine. Over half of all reported DPSRM cases involved
slander rather than libel; between half and one-third of all
reported DPSRM cases involved slander and were not
governed by an idiosyncratic statute.341 This shift away from
SPSRM, which might have arisen out of judicial concern over
the dependence in slander cases on testimony of subjective
witnesses or over the exact nature of the damage done by
slanderous racial misidentification, had the effect of severely
shrinking the universe of potential DPSRM cases, and
removed from viability many of the most common sorts of
traditional DPSRM claims.
During the twentieth century, judges in Illinois,
Kentucky, Mississippi, New York, and (arguably)
Tennessee 42 moved away from the doctrine of SPSRM, often
in favor of the doctrine of LPSRM. 4 3 In 1911, for example, in
Williams v. Riddle, Judge Shackleford Miller of the Court of
Appeals of Kentucky rejected the SPSRM doctrine, but noted
that "[there is a marked distinction, probably the result of
some historical accident, between slander and libel."3 " In
terms of slander, Miller explained, it is only when "oral
charges of dishonesty, rascality, or general depravity are
uttered or spoken of a person in his business or employment,
or impute to him the commission of a crime, that they are
actionable per se."3 45  Three years later, in MacIntyre v.
Fruchter, New York Judge Tompkins similarly rejected the
theory of SPSRM, but without discussion noted that the court
would accept a theory of LPSRM 46 The words "would have
341. See infra note 356.
342. In its decision in Stultz v. Cousins, 242 F. 794 (6th Cir. 1917), the Sixth
Circuit was interpreting Tennessee law. See infra notes 348-49 and
accompanying text.
343. In response to scathing judicial criticism, in at least one other state
(Virginia), the state supreme court moved to eliminate the distinction between
slander and libel. See G.M.M., Defamation in Virginia-A Merger of Libel and
Slander, 47 VA. L. REV. 1116, 1125-26 (1961).
344. Williams v. Riddle, 140 S.W. 661, 661 (Ky. 1911) (holding that, given the
traditional common law rule of slander per se, it was not slander per se to say of
a white man that he was a "damn negro, and his mother was a mulatto").
345. See Williams, 140 S.W. at 662 (citing Brooker v. Coffin, 5 Johns. 188
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1809)).
346. See MacIntyre v. Fruchter, 148 N.Y.S. 786, 786 (Sup. Ct. 1914) (finding
the defendant not liable absent proof of damages where the defendant stated
that the plaintiff was "a dirty bitch .... only fit for niggers to associate with,"
on the grounds that only allegations of unchastity or criminal activity could
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been libelous per se, had they been written or printed,"
explained Judge Tompkins, "but, having been spoken only,
are not slanderous per se, because they do not charge or
import the commission of a crime by the plaintiff, and do not
impute unchastity to her."347  Three years after MacIntyre,
the Sixth Circuit in Stultz34 8-even as it affirmed the "general
rule" regarding LPSRM-in dicta seemed to suggest that the
SPSRM doctrine might no longer be viable in Tennessee. 49
In the 1935 Illinois case of Wright, Presiding Justice Edwards
was far more explicit in explaining his rejection of the
doctrine of SPSRM on the grounds that racial defamation did
not constitute one of the traditional four categories of slander
per se:3
50
In considering whether a defematory [sic] charge is
actionable or not, the distinction between oral and written
words must be kept in mind, as the same rules of law do
not apply to libel, as to slander, the law of the former
being wider than that of the latter. Defamatory matter,
printed and published, may be actionable per se, while the
same words, orally spoken, would not be so, except they
occasion special damage.
The reasons given for such rule are that words written
or printed are in more permanent form, are susceptible of
wider circulation, and hence capable of inflicting greater
injury than those merely spoken; also, that a defamation
made in script or print necessitates some measure of
deliberation, and so, of itself, imputes an evil intention to
constitute slander per se).
347. Id.
348. Stultz v. Cousins, 242 F. 794 (6th Cir. 1917).
349. See id. at 797 (referring to "whatever be the rule as to spoken words"
while affirming the per se libel rule for printed words).
350. See Wright v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 281 II. App. 495 (App. Ct. 1935)
(holding that a woman customer was not entitled to recover from the store, the
employees of which informed her that she was a "nigger" and that therefore
they would not serve her). The four classes of spoken words giving rise to per se
liability include:
(1) [Wlords imputing to the party the commission of a criminal offense;
(2) words which impute that the party is infected with some contagious
disease, where, if the accusation be true, it would exclude the party
from society; (3) defamatory words which impute to the party unfitness
to perform the duties of an office or employment of profit, or the want of
integrity in the discharge of the duties of such office or employment;
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the writer, as a person who reduces a defamation to
writing, is, by law, presumed to have convinced himself of
its truth, and to have acted accordingly. 351
In one of the last reported DPSRM cases, the 1954
Mississippi decision in Natchez Times, Presiding Justice
Roberds similarly seemed to highlight in dicta the difference
between slander per se and libel per se, and indicated clearly
that Mississippi would not recognize the doctrine of SPSRM-
even as he held that publishing of a white woman that she
was black constituted libel per se.35 2
At the same time that judges in Illinois, Kentucky,
Mississippi, and New York were increasingly moving away
from the doctrine of SPSRM in favor of the doctrine of
LPSRM, judges in Alabama, Louisiana, and possibly Virginia
were also acting to incorporate malice components into the
general defamation doctrine, and so raise the burden of proof
on prospective plaintiffs in both libel and slander cases. As
early as 1842, the Louisiana Supreme Court in Boullemet v.
Philips reversed a finding for the plaintiff where the
defendant alleged that the plaintiffs family was not white
and that the plaintiffs mother was a colored woman, on the
grounds that the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate actual
malice.3"3 In 1914, the Virginia Supreme Court in Spencer
held that a defendant was liable for saying of the plaintiffs
that they "are nothing but God damned negroes."354 The next
year, the Alabama court in Jones v. R.L. Polk & Co. held that
the defendant had not libeled Jones by accidently placing an
asterisk by her name in the Selma City Directory and so
falsely indicating that she was "colored."355
351. Id. at 497-98.
352. See Natchez Times Publ'g Co. v. Dunigan, 72 So. 2d 681 (Miss. 1954);
supra notes 332-33 and accompanying text. "It is noted, in this connection,"
Roberds explained, "that generally to orally call a white person a Negro is not
actionable per se, but it may be actionable in certain sections of the country
under the social habits and customs prevailing in those sections." Natchez
Times Publ'g Co., 72 So. 2d at 683-84.
353. See Boullemet v. Philips, 2 Rob. 365 (La. 1842).
354. Spencer v. Looney, 82 S.E. 745 (Va. 1914). While the defendant might
have had qualified immunity, the court explained, insomuch as the defendant
was seeking to test the plaintiffs right to have children educated at a white
public school, the defendant had nonetheless forfeited his qualified immunity by
speaking with malice. Id. at 746.
355. Jones v. R.L. Polk & Co., 67 So. 577 (Ala. 1915). "[In the peculiar social
conditions prevailing in this jurisdiction," publishing that a white woman is
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With their gradual move away from the SPSRM doctrine,
and the occasional concomitant move towards requiring that
words be spoken with actual malice in order to qualify as per
se defamatory, judges effectively removed from the universe
of potential DPSRM claims exactly the sorts of fact patterns
that had constituted over half of all reported DPSRM cases
since the late 1700s. Of the approximately thirty-five to
forty-four DPSRM cases decided or discussed by courts
between 1791 and 1957, approximately twenty-five involved
claims of something like slander per se by racial
misidentification.3 56  Of these twenty-five cases, sixteen
colored "is libelous within the definition of libel commonly found in the books,"
explained Judge Sayre. Id. at 577. At the same time, "whether, then, such a
publication is libelous in any particular case depends upon circumstances. Here
then is room for innocent mistakes." Id.
356. Of these twenty-two cases, sixteen involved slander claims under either
a straight community standards per se common law model or under Louisiana's
effectively per se model. See Johnson v. Brown, 13 F. Cas. 734 (C.C.D.C. 1832)
(No. 7375) (holding that a statement that the plaintiff was "'a yellow negro, son
of a bitch, a villain, and a liar'" did not constitute defamation per se because of
the absence of a statute stripping rights from non-whites); Bagwell v. Rice &
Hutchins Atlanta Co., 143 S.E. 125 (Ga. Ct. App. 1928) (holding barred by a
statute of limitations a woman's slander claim against a shoe salesman who
allegedly told her that "'[y]ou infernal negroes will put yourselves among white
people, get over with the negroes where you belong' "); Wright, 281 Ill. App. 495;
Jones v. Gill, 66 P.2d 1033 (Kan. 1937) (reversing on evidentiary grounds a
decision holding the defendant liable for alleging that the plaintiff, who had
been adopted by the defendant's adult step-son and his wife, was a "half-breed");
Williams v. Riddle, 140 S.W. 661 (Ky. 1911) (holding that, given the traditional
common law rule of slander per se, it was not slander per se to say of a white
man that he was a "'damn negro, and his mother was a mulatto'"); Boullemet, 2
Rob. 365; Spotorno v. Fourichon, 4 So. 71, 71 (La. 1888) (holding a defendant
liable for saying that the plaintiff "was a negro"); Toye v. McMahon, 21 La.
Ann. 308 (1869) (affirming on evidentiary grounds a ruling that the defendant
had not slandered the defendant by allegedly informing the Hackmen's
Benevolent Association of New Orleans that the defendant was "a negro");
Dobard v. Nunez, 6 La. Ann. 294 (1851) (limiting the plaintiff to nominal
damages where the defendant repeated, without evidence of malice and
apparently without injuring the plaintiff, the allegation he had heard that "'the
families of Martin and Lafrance are colored people'"); Berot v. Porte, 81 So. 323
(La. 1919) (rejecting the plaintiffs claim that he had been slandered by being
incorrectly described as being of "negro blood," on the grounds that the speaker
had a duty to report allegations of race to the society to which the plaintiff had
applied); MacIntyre v. Fruchter, 148 N.Y.S. 786 (Sup. Ct. 1914); Kenworthy v.
Brown, 92 N.Y.S. 34 (App. Div. 1904) (rejecting the claim that the defendant
had slandered a woman by saying that she was "only a low woman" and "half
negress," and so implied that the woman was unchaste); Deese v. Collins, 133
S.E. 92 (N.C. 1926) (rejecting the doctrine of defamation per se and holding that
a statement that a man "has negro blood in his veins" does not constitute
slander absent proof of special damages); McDowell v. Bowles, 53 N.C. (8 Jones)
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involving claims of slander were not governed by idiosyncratic
statutes stripping rights from non-whites or establishing
highly protective defamation regimes.357 Of these sixteen
remaining slander cases, six involved defendants who were,
for various reasons, found not liable; 358 four arose in states
that later moved away from the doctrine of SPSRM in favor of
the doctrine of LPSRM;359 and six arose in states in which
courts had arguably added the requirement that plaintiffs in
DPSRM cases prove that defendants had acted with actual
malice.36° This means that by the mid-1950s, the judicial
shift in many states away from the doctrine of SPSRM or
toward importing a malice requirement into the DPSRM
doctrine had removed from the universe of viable DPSRM
claims (absent actual malice) every one of the slander cases
decided after 1791 in which courts had found defendants
liable under non-statutory DPSRM theories. If courts in the
few remaining states embracing the DPSRM rule were, by the
middle of the twentieth century, similarly drawn more toward
the doctrine of libel per se than to that of slander per se, then
after the 1950s the cases that had formed the majority of the
DPSRM doctrinal corpus no longer represented viable
DPSRM claims.
B. The Changing Social and Statutory Context
This Section examines the effect on the universe of
184 (1860) (holding, under the common law definition of words actionable in
themselves, that it was not actionable per se to say of a white man that he was
a "free Negro" and so could not vote); Barrett v. Jarvis, 1 Tapp. 244 (5th Cir.
Ohio 1818) (holding a defendant not liable where the defendant announced that
a family was "akin to negroes," possibly on the grounds that the comment had
been made about the plaintiffs daughters rather than about the plaintiff
himself); Spencer, 82 S.E. 745. Eight or nine cases, which are perhaps better
included in the discussion of societal and statutory change, see infra Part III.B,
involved either slander claims ultimately determined by the unusual and highly
protective defamation statutes of Mississippi, Virginia, Arkansas, and
Oklahoma, or under the rights deprivation model, which was built around the
idiosyncratic South Carolina Slave Act of 1740. See infra notes 364-65.
357. See supra note 356. The remaining eight or nine claims are discussed
infra, Part III.B.
358. See Johnson, 13 F. Cas. 734; Bagwell, 143 S.E. 125; Jones, 66 P.2d 1033;
Deese, 133 S.E. 92; McDowell, 53 N.C. (8 Jones) 184; Barrett, 1 Tapp. 244.
359. See Wright, 281 Ill. App. 495; Williams, 140 S.W. 661; Kenworthy, 92
N.Y.S. 34; MacIntyre, 148 N.Y.S. 786.
360. See Boullemet, 2 Rob. 365; Spotorno, 4 So. 71; Toye, 21 La. Ann. 308;
Dobard, 6 La. Ann. 294; Berot, 81 So. 323; Spencer, 82 S.E. 745.
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DPSRM cases of changing societal notions of proper race
relations, developing statutory proscriptions on official, state-
sponsored racism, and legislative rewriting of overly
protective defamation statutes. Quite apart from any effect
increasing rights consciousness and racial tolerance had on
the plaintiffs, attorneys, and judges who might have been
involved in (and embarrassed by) DPSRM cases, the
abolishment of Jim Crow and other changes in society and
statutes had the effect of choking off most or all potential
DPSRM cases alleging official racial misidentification and
many potential DPSRM cases historically brought under
idiosyncratic statutory regimes. Put another way, if the state
was no longer in the business of categorizing or identifying
individuals by race in official documents or directories, then
there was no chance that the state would racially misidentify
any individuals. If places of public accommodation could no
longer maintain separate rail cars, water fountains, or
elevators for whites and non-whites, then there was no
chance that employees in these places would incorrectly
require whites to use the non-white facilities. Approximately
one-third of all reported DPSRM cases were brought under
statutory and societal regimes that had vanished by the
middle of the twentieth century. 61 Thus the societal and
statutory changes by that time had the effect of severely
shrinking the universe of potential DPSRM cases-
particularly all claims which involved any related element of
racial misidentification in places of public accommodation.
Between the middle of the nineteenth century and the
middle of the twentieth century, social and legislative
changes made obsolete two statutes or regimes-the South
Carolina Slave Act of 1740 and the Jim Crow system of
legalized racism-under which plaintiffs had pursued almost
one-third of all DPSRM cases between 1791 and 1957. South
Carolina's Slave Act of 1740, which stripped all civil rights
from non-whites and so fostered the rights deprivation
DSPRM theory, was the first to go, as it was invalidated by
the Union victory in the Civil War and the Thirteenth
Amendment, which outlawed slavery. 62 By far the most
sweeping societal change affecting DSPRM cases, however,
361. See infra notes 364-66.
362. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
20101 399
400 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:50
came with the legislative abolition in the 1960s of the Jim
Crow system of legalized racism.363  Together, these
developments meant that by the middle of the 1960s state,
federal, and local governments were not permitted to
discriminate on the basis of race and places of public
accommodation were not permitted to maintain separate
facilities for whites and non-whites.
With the societal and statutory moves away from
legalized racism by state and local governments or in places
of public accommodation, many of the traditional DPSRM fact
patterns were no longer viable prospective DPSRM claims.
Of the thirty-five to forty-four reported DPSRM cases
between the end of the eighteenth century and the middle of
the twentieth century, three or four were brought under
South Carolina's idiosyncratic Slave Act of 1740,364 six were
brought under the enormously protective anti-dueling
defamation statutes in states such as Virginia, Oklahoma,
and Mississippi, 36 and at least five were brought under the
363. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006); Civil Rights Act
of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
364. See Smith v. Hamilton, 44 S.C.L. (10 Rich.) 44, 48 (Ct. App. 1856)
(holding that a plaintiff bringing suit against a defendant who had allegedly
said that the plaintiff had a mulatto child did not need to plead that she herself
was white); Atkinson v. Hartley, 12 S.C.L. (1 McCord) 203, 204 (Const. Ct. App.
1821) (finding a defendant not liable where it was unclear whether the
defendant had called the plaintiff a "'damned mulatto son of a bitch'" or a
"'damned mulatto-looking son of a bitch'"); King v. Wood, 10 S.C.L. (1 Nott &
McC.) 184 (Const. Ct. App. 1818) (reaffirming the rights deprivation model of
DPSRM in South Carolina); Eden v. Legare, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 171 (Ct. Com. P1.
& Gen. Sess. 1791) (establishing the rights deprivation model and finding a
defendant liable for calling the plaintiff a "mulatto"); supra note 83.
365. Six cases involved slander claims ultimately determined under the
unusual and highly protective defamation statutes of Mississippi, Virginia,
Arkansas, and Oklahoma. See Morris v. State, 160 S.W. 387 (Ark. 1913)
(finding Bill Morris guilty under Arkansas's criminal defamation statute for
alleging that Mrs. James Holt's "father was a thief, her mother a negro, and she
was a half-breed"); Scott v. Peebles, 10 Miss. (2 S. & M.) 546 (1844) (holding
Alpha Peebles liable for slandering James Scott under Mississippi's slander
statute where Peebles alleged in a conversation with a third party that Scott
"'had negro blood in him'"); Hargrove v. Okla. Press Publ'g Co., 265 P. 635
(Okla. 1928) (restating and embracing the general DPSRM rule, but
nonetheless finding a newspaper not liable for defaming a woman when it
published an article identifying her husband as a Negro because liability in
such a case would be "stretching the rule of libel too far"); Collins v. Okla. State
Hosp., 184 P. 946 (Okla. 1916) (finding, despite referring to the correctness of
the DPSRM doctrine, a defendant hospital not liable where the plaintiffs
daughter, a resident in a hospital for the insane, had been mistakenly assigned
to a colored ward and had her charts flagged with the word "colored"); Cook v.
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officially racist regimes of Jim Crow.366 With the Union
victory in the Civil War, cases such as Eden v. Legare,
Atkinson, King, and Smith v. Hamilton ceased to represent
even potential DPSRM claims. More importantly (and more
recently), the move away from the Jim Crow regime of
legalized racism had the immediate effect of removing from
the universe of potential DPSRM claims all instances in
which the state somehow misrepresented an individual's
race-as, for example, the city of Selma had mistakenly
misidentified a plaintiff as non-white in the city directory in
Jones.367 With the societal and statutory changes between
the end of the Civil War and the middle of the twentieth
century, the universe of potential DPSRM cases thus shrank
to exclude most official cases of racial misidentification and
all cases brought under the now-obsolete slavery statute that
Patterson Drug Co., 39 S.E.2d 304 (Va. 1946) (holding that juries considering
defamation cases under Virginia's defamation statute should not consider the
intent of the speaker, in a case in which a soda jerk refused to serve a white
man whom the soda jerk believed was non-white, and so holding open the
possibility of liability); Mopsikov v. Cook, 95 S.E. 426 (Va. 1918) (reversing on
technical grounds, while affirming the liability rule under the Virginia statute,
a finding for the plaintiff in which the defendant's daughter routinely referred
to Cook's young daughter as "a nigger doll"); supra note 118. In other words, of
these six cases, the courts in three (Collins, Hargrove, and Mopsikov) found
that, for various reasons, the defendants were not liable under the relevant
statutes. Mopsikov was decided on technical grounds, but the decisions in
Collins and Hargrove seem to demonstrate that Oklahoma courts were
reluctant to find liability in these sorts of cases.
366. See, e.g., Wolfe v. Ga. Ry. & Elec. Co., 58 S.E. 899 (Ga. Ct. App. 1907)
(holding that the lower court had erred by dismissing a defamation complaint
by a white man who was ordered by a conductor to sit in the section of the car
designated for non-whites); S. Ry. Co. v. Thurman, 90 S.W. 240 (Ky. 1906)
(holding that it was not a legal injury "for a white person to be taken for a
negro" where a woman was forced by a train brakeman to leave a railroad car
reserved for whites); Lee v. New Orleans Great N. R.R. Co., 51 So. 182 (La.
1910) (affirming the dismissal of a suit by two teenage girls, whose maternal
grandfather was of mixed blood, who were forced to ride in the Jim Crow car);
May v. Shreveport Traction Co., 53 So. 671 (La. 1910) (holding a streetcar
company liable when a conductor suggested that a passenger belonged in the
section of the car reserved for blacks); O'Connor v. Dallas Cotton Exch., 153
S.W.2d 266 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) (reversing on jurisdictional grounds and
remanding for trial a case in which a husband alleged that his white wife had
been injured by being forced to ride an elevator reserved for Negroes). This
article does not fully examine the many cases brought under the doctrine of
RMPPA that did not directly overlap with the doctrine of DPSRM. See, e.g.,
Sharfstein, supra note 44.
367. See, e.g., Jones v. R.L. Polk & Co., 67 So. 577 (Ala. 1915).
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had helped nurture the DPSRM doctrine in South Carolina. 68
C. First Amendment Constraints on Libel Cases Against
Media Outlets
The Supreme Court's application, in the mid-to-late
twentieth century, of First Amendment doctrine to tort
liability necessarily limited the liability of media outlets
covering public figures or matters of public concern, and so
had the effect of further shrinking the universe of potential
DPSRM cases. Almost one-third of all reported DPSRM cases
involved media outlets .369 By limiting liability for media
outlets to cases involving negligence, or possibly even actual
malice, the Supreme Court effectively removed from the
universe of potential DPSRM cases every single reported fact
pattern involving media outlets that courts had seen since the
late eighteenth century.
Beginning in the mid-1960s, the United States Supreme
Court began severely limiting tort liability in cases involving
claims of defamation and libel, such that by the 1970s
plaintiffs seeking to win such cases against media outlets
generally had to prove actual malice-that the newspapers
368. Statutory changes alone cannot explain the disappearance of cases such
as Morris, 160 S.W. 387, Scott, 10 Miss. (2 S. & M.) 546, and Cook, 39 S.E.2d
304, in Virginia, Arkansas, Mississippi, and perhaps Oklahoma. The anti-
dueling "actionable words" and "insulting words" defamation statutes remained
in effect through the middle of the twentieth century, and in fact remain in
effect today. See MISS. CODE § 95-1-1 (2008) ("Certain words actionable: All
words which, from their usual construction and common acceptation, are
considered as insults, and calculated to lead to a breach of the peace, shall be
actionable; and a plea, exception or demurrer shall not be sustained to preclude
a jury from passing thereon, who are the sole judges of the damages sustained;
but this shall not deprive the courts of the power to grant new trials, as in other
cases."); VA. CODE. § 8.01-45 (2009) ("Action for insulting words: All words shall
be actionable which from their usual construction and common acceptance are
construed as insults and tend to violence and breach of the peace."); W. VA.
CODE §55-7-2 (2009) ("Insulting words: All words which, from their usual
construction and common acceptation, are construed as insults and tend to
violence and breach of the peace, shall be actionable. No demurrer shall
preclude a jury from passing thereon."); see also S.J.B., The Actionable Words
Statute in Virginia, 27 VA. L. REV. 405, 407 (1941); supra notes 97, 118. Either
the doctrine of DPSRM remained statutorily alive and well in these states
throughout the middle of the twentieth century, or (more likely, given the
absence of later reported cases in these jurisdictions) perhaps the general
societal move away from state-sponsored racism helped make it socially
impossible for judges to find liability in DPSRM-Iike cases.
369. See infra note 380.
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had been acting with reckless disregard of the truth-in order
to recover more than actual damages, or often to recover
anything at all.370 The Court began expanding protections for
media outlets with the 1964 decision in New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan, in which the Court held that public officials
cannot recover damages for defamatory falsehood relating to
official conduct unless those public officials can prove that the
false statements were made with actual malice. 371  Three
years later, in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, the Court
extended this standard to cover public figures as well as
public officials.37 2  Seven years after Curtis, the Court in
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., held that while states may freely
establish their own standards of liability for defamatory
statements made about private individuals (provided that the
states do not impose liability without fault), if any state sets a
standard lower than actual malice, then plaintiffs may
recover only actual (rather than punitive) damages.373
Together, New York Times Co., Curtis, and Gertz
effectively required that anyone bringing a per se defamation
claim against a media outlet prove actual malice. Per se
defamation is, by definition, defamation in which the
plaintiffs need not demonstrate any actual damages. New
York Times Co. and Curtis explicitly required that all public
officials and public figures bringing defamation cases against
media outlets prove that those outlets have acted with
actual malice. 74 Gertz, meanwhile, effectively required that
(depending on state defamation laws) private figures bringing
defamation cases against media outlets either prove actual
malice, or else prove actual damages.375 Put another way,
together New York Times Co., Curtis, and Gertz raised the
standard in true per se defamation cases against media
outlets to actual malice; in any other sort of case, in which
370. See, e.g., ERWIN CHIEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1044-55 (3d ed.
2006).
371. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
372. See Curtis Publ'g. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
373. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
374. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 370, at 1045-49.
375. After Gertz, private individuals bringing defamation claims against
media outlets will either bring such claims in states that have set the
defamation standard at actual malice, or else will bring such claims in states in
which the standard is lower than actual malice-in which case, in order to
recover anything, the plaintiffs must prove actual damages.
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private individuals have to prove actual damages, the
concept of "per se" liability, rather than non-per se liability,
essentially vanished.
With its application of First Amendment doctrine to tort
liability for defamation effectively limited the per se liability
of media outlets in libel cases to those instances in which the
plaintiffs could prove actual malice, the Supreme Court
removed from the universe of potential DPSRM claims the
sorts of fact patterns that had constituted almost one-third of
all reported DPSRM cases since the late 1700s. Of the
approximately thirty-five to forty-four DPSRM cases decided
or discussed by courts between 1791 and 1957, somewhere
between ten and eleven involved claims that media outlets
(always, in those days, newspapers) had misidentified in print
whites as non-whites. 76 Judges in two of these cases (and
thus two of the seven states in which such cases were
376. See Atlanta Journal Co. v. Farmer, 172 S.E. 647 (Ga. Ct. App. 1934)
(holding that a newspaper publication describing a white man (but not his
parents) as "negro" did not constitute libel against his parents); Mitchell v
Tribune Co., 99 N.E.2d 397 (Ill. App. 1951) (holding that a plaintiffs contention
that he had been identified in a newspaper as "Isaiah 'Chink' Mitchell, 'Negro'"
failed to state a cause of action for libel); Upton v. Times-Democrat Publ'g Co.,
28 So. 970 (La. 1900) (affirming a judgment awarding actual, but not punitive,
damages to a plaintiff who was misidentified as non-white in a newspaper after
the telegraph office changed the word "cultured" to "colored" as it transmitted a
reporter's article); Natchez Times Publ'g Co. v. Dunigan, 72 So. 2d 681 (Miss.
1954) (holding that it is libelous per se in Mississippi for a newspaper to
misidentify a white woman as "Negro" in an article); Monks v. Orange County
Indep. Co., 277 N.Y.S. 992 (App. Div. 1935) (overturning a lower court decision
to dismiss a DPSRM claim as not stating a sufficient cause of action); Bowen v.
Indep. Publ'g Co., 96 S.E.2d 564 (S.C. 1957) (affirming the DPSRM rule where a
newspaper published the name of a white soldier under the picture of a black
soldier); Flood v. News & Courier Co., 50 S.E. 637 (S.C. 1905) (holding a
newspaper liable where an article accidently misidentified a plaintiff in an
ongoing case as "colored"); Flood v. Evening Post Publ'g Co., 50 S.E. 641 (S.C.
1905) (restating the holding in Flood v. News & Courier Co., 50 S.E. at 637);
Express Publ'g Co. v Orsborn, 151 S.W. 574 (Tex. Ct. App. 1912) (holding that
for the purpose of determining liability the lower court should read together two
separate newspaper stories, one identifying the plaintiff by name, but not race,
and the other misidentifying the plaintiff by race but not identifying the
plaintiff by name). Johnson v. Staten Island Advance Newspaper Inc., No.
38480/03, 2004 WL 4986754 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. July 23, 2004), which was essentially
laughed out of court by a New York judge, might also constitute a DPSRM case.
Hargrove v. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co., 265 P. 635 (Okla. 1928), would
constitute an eleventh DPSRM media case, except that the Hargrove court,
despite its language regarding the community standards model, ultimately
based its decision on the local Oklahoma defamation statute. See supra note
365.
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decided) ultimately rejected the DPSRM doctrine outright,3 "
while the judges in two others found that there was no
liability under the facts alleged378 and the judge in a fifth case
found that the newspaper, while liable, had not
misrepresented the plaintiffs race with malicious intent. 79
The remaining six cases all involved situations in which
newspapers had apparently mistakenly or accidently racially
misidentified the plaintiffs; there was no suggestion in any of
these cases that the newspaper defendants had acted so
recklessly as to meet the modern conception of actual
malice.38 0 This suggests that after New York Times Co.,
Curtis, and Gertz, not one of the ten or eleven reported cases
implicating the DPSRM doctrine in relation to the media
would have represented a viable claim. The Supreme Court
thus effectively removed from the universe of potential
DPSRM claims any instance in which the plaintiffs could not
prove actual malice on the part of the newspapers racially
misidentifying prospective plaintiffs.
CONCLUSION
The eagerness or willingness of some judges in the
American South and West to accept and even advance the
doctrine of defamation per se by racial misidentification
between the last years of the eighteenth century and the
middle of the twentieth century, even when conflating
disparate and unrelated doctrines, helps to demonstrate the
insidious power of racism in United States history. The
DPSRM doctrine had a strange and tortured history:
introduced into the common law either by accident or by
improper design, the doctrine was routinely cited incorrectly
by courts reaching similar results but with vastly different
reasoning. In the end, this seemingly powerful (and, to
modern sensibilities, horrible) racial tort vanished with
barely a trace during a time of enormously heightened racial
consciousness-arguably in great part because major societal,
377. See Mitchell, 99 N.E.2d 397; Johnson, 2004 WL 4986754.
378. Atlanta Journal, Co., 172 S.E. 647; Hargrove, 265 P. 635.
379. See Upton, 28 So. 970.
380. In Upton, for example, the court determined that it was the telegraph
company that had mistakenly transmitted the word "colored" instead of
"cultured," and that the newspaper had not done any greater harm by changing
"colored" to "Negro." See id.
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jurisprudential, and legislative trends helped to shrink the
universe of potential DPSRM claims and so choke off the
doctrine at its source. Apart from standing merely as one
more reminder of this country's racist past, then, this
doctrine also stands as one more example of the interesting,
varied, and complicated interweaving of American society,
law and jurisprudence.
